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THE CONSTITUTION AS AN OBSTACLE TO GOVERNMENT
ETHICS-REFORMIST LEGISLATION AFTER NATIONAL
TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION
GEORGE D. BROWN*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT ETHIcs
LAWS
Widespread cynicism about government and outright distrust
of public institutions-as well as of those people who occupy
them-represent a top priority item on the American national
agenda. Many people feel that their elected representatives do
not represent them and that their appointed public servants do
not serve them. "Reforms" are essential, but they are often hard
to achieve. A major obstacle to reform arises from the fact that
the same public institutions in which change is sought are usu-
ally those that must act to bring it about. Often they refuse to
do so.
Campaign finance reform died in the United States Senate in
1994 despite the fact that it was a major issue for the Democrat-
ic Party, which controlled both houses of Congress as well as the
presidency.' Term limits figure prominently in the Republican
Contract with America.' Nevertheless, the ability of the Repub-
lican Party, which now controls both houses of Congress, to
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, Harvard University;
LL.B. 1965, Harvard Law School. Chairman, Massachusetts State Ethics Commission.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the Author and do not represent
the position of the Commission. Research for this Article was supported by a grant
from the Boston College Law School Dean's Fund. The Author wishes to thank his
colleagues for their helpful comments arising from the presentation of an early ver-
sion of this Article at a Boston College Law School Faculty Colloquium.
1. An important mechanism of the proposed legislation, Senate Bill 3, was a tax
on campaign receipts. S. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For a discussion of the bill
and the constitutional issues presented, see Kenneth J. Levit, Note, Campaign Fi-
nance Reform and the Return of Buckley v. Valeo, 103 YALE L.J. 469, 476-77, 486-
503 (1993).
2. See RESTORING THE DREAM 12, 32-33 (Stephen Moore ed., 1995) (outlining
Republican Party's commitment to term limits).
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bring about federal term limits initiatives is in doubt.' At the
state level, term limits have succeeded primarily because citi-
zens groups have been able to bypass the normal legislative
process through referenda and initiatives.4 Elected public offi-
cials are not always receptive to the call of "Physician, heal
thyself."
Elected officials, however, sometimes do enact reforms. Con-
gress has passed an array of ethics statutes, particularly in the
post-Watergate era.5 President Clinton's first Executive Order
dealt with ethics,' and at least three-quarters of the states have
enacted statutes dealing with this set of issues.7
In general terms, ethics laws deal with practices by public
officials that present dangers such as undue private influence
upon governmental decisions, use of public office for private
gain, and unequal treatment of citizens.' A recurring underlying
theme in ethics laws is the importance of public confidence and
the need for the appearance of a government free from impropri-
eties.9 These laws ban or limit many specific practices, including
gratuities to public officials, private supplementation of public
salaries, action by officials in matters in which they have a per-
3. Grover G. Norquist, A Limited Future, AM. SPECTATOR, Aug. 1995, at 58, 59.
4. The Norquist article includes a chart of 20 states with state legislator term
limits. Nineteen of these provisions were adopted by popular vote. Id.
5. According to an American Bar Association Committee Report, "[alt no time in
the history of our country has government ethics been more intensively scrutinized
and extensively regulated." Cynthia Farina, ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards, Keeping
Faith: Government Ethics & Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 287,
290 (1993).
6. Exec. Order No. 12,834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993).
7. Kevin V. McAlevy, Note, Conflicts of Interest and State Legislatures: Virginia
As a Case Study, 5 J.L. & POL. 209, 213 (1988). Throughout this Article, I use the
terms "public official" and "public employee" interchangeably.
8. See generally Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control
Limits on the Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 57, 71-81
(1992) (outlining goals of conflict of interest regulation).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520,
562 (1961).
The statute is directed at an evil which endangers the very fabric of a
democratic society, for a democracy is effective only if the people have
faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when
high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse sus-
picions of malfeasance and corruption.
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sonal interest, and postemployment activities in which former
government employees interact with government-the so-called
"revolving door" problem. Taken together, the many federal and
state statutes, executive orders, and regulations constitute a
true body of law-a set of enforceable commands with their pur-
poses and contents widely known and understood by those sub-
ject to them."
Last term, the Supreme Court dealt this body of law a poten-
tially serious blow. In United States v. National Treasury Em-
ployees Union," the Court struck down a provision of the Eth-
ics Reform Act of 198912 (the Act) that prohibited the receipt of
honoraria by federal employees and officials." The Court found
that the statute violated the First Amendment's command that
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech." 4 The Court relied primarily on prior cases that used a
balancing approach to determine the right of the government as
employer to discipline employees for words that they had said or
written. 5 In the honoraria context, the opinion weighed the
interest of public employees in speaking and writing for compen-
sation and the interest of their potential audience against the
government's interests in efficiency and integrity of the public
service and its interests in avoiding the appearance of undue
influence and its ability to administer an honoraria limita-
tion. 6 The Court held that the government's asserted interests
could not justify imposition of the ban on middle- and lower-
ranking employees of the executive branch. 7
Constitutional questions abound in the ethics-law area. Na-
10. For an excellent discussion of the federal dimensions of this law,,see Nolan,
supra note 8, and for an early but still helpful analysis of the Massachusetts provi-
sions, see William G. Buss, Jr., The Massachusetts Conflict-of-Interest Statute: An
Analysis, 45 B.U. L. REV. 299 (1965).
11. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
12. 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (Supp. V 1993).
13. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1008.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1012-13 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 114 S.
Ct. 1878 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
16. Id. at 1012-16.
17. Id. at 1016.
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tional Treasury may be correct on its facts. The law did sweep,
in blunderbuss fashion, across a range of expressive activities
that pose little danger to ethics in government.18 The case also
is an important reminder of the constitutional rights and private
concerns of public employees.
Nevertheless, three distinct aspects of the decision merit
serious concern. The first is methodological. The majority
seemed to exhibit a grudging attitude towards ethics regulation
in general. It showed little or no deference towards Congress's
experience and expertise in developing standards for the integ-
rity of the public service or toward Congress's competence in
determining how particular practices appear to the public. 9 In
the First Amendment context, at least, the Court may have
constructed a balancing test that the government can almost
never win. A second concern is that the decision casts doubt
upon the constitutionality of other ethics laws. For example,
questions now will be raised about some aspects of "revolving
door" provisions and statutory standards based directly on the
concept of appearance of impropriety-what might be referred
to as "smell-test ethics." A third concern is that National Trea-
sury may have a potentially broad sweep, extending beyond
ethics laws into such closely related areas of government re-
form as campaign finance legislation and restrictions on gov-
ernment employees' political activities."
National Treasury suggests answers that bode ill for the cause
of reform. For example, it appears to represent a significant
reaffirmation of aspects of Buckley v. Valeo,' a decision that
has been a major roadblock to campaign finance legislation.22
In recent congressional debates, opponents of changes in the
18. Farina, supra note 5, at 320; Nolan, supra note 8, at 108-14; see National
Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1020-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
19. See National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016 (noting that "several features of the
honoraria ban's text cast serious doubt on the Government's submission that Con-
gress perceived honoraria as so threatening to the efficiency of the entire federal
service as to render the ban a reasonable response to the threat").
20. See infra parts IV-VI.
21. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
22. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle
of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1211 (advocating overruling Buckley).
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existing system cited Buckley as a constitutional ban to
reformist initiatives.' Ethics laws have their opponents too;
perhaps National Treasury will become their Buckley v. Valeo.
This Article both analyzes National Treasury and explores its
broader implications. I have written the piece not only from the
perspective of an academic legal analyst but also from that of a
public official active in the drafting and interpretation of a com-
prehensive set of ethics laws.24 Approaching it wearing either of
these hats, I find the decision troubling. Part II of the Article
outlines National Treasury in some detail and explores its major
issues. These issues include the role of First Amendment analy-
sis, the rights and status of public employees, the majority's
relative lack of concern with what might be called ethics-law
analysis, and its lack of deference to Congress. In the latter
context, I suggest some parallels with another major case of the
1994 Term, United States v. Lopez.'
Part III examines some possible impacts of National Treasury
on the drafting of laws to address a number of ethics issues,
especially those relating to postemployment restrictions and
attempts to utilize the notion of appearance of impropriety as a
standard of conduct. Strict applications of constitutional prohibi-
tions such as those that occurred in National Treasury may pose
serious void-for-vagueness problems for standards of the latter
type. I also explore some possible nonconstitutional implications
of National Treasury for the drafting of ethics statutes. The case
reflects uneasiness with what the majority referred to as "whole-
sale prophylactic rule[s]."26 Such rules are a widely used tech-
nique in the field of ethics law. They are subject to some criti-
cism, however, and National Treasury may reinforce this criti-
23. See Levit, supra note 1, at 477 (reporting plan by Senate critics to mount
challenge based on Buckley if reform bill passes).
24. In addition to serving as Chairman of the Massachusetts State Ethics Com-
mission, I also served from September 1994 to June 1995 as an ex officio member of
the Massachusetts Special Commission Relative to the Conflict of Interest Laws and
the Financial Disclosure of Certain Public Officials and Employees. The report of
this Commission, cited as Mass. Special Commission Report, is discussed infra part
III.D. See infra text accompanying notes 341-46.
25. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
26. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1017
(1995).
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cism, lending to it the Supreme Court's considerable prestige.
Parts IV and V explore the ramifications of the case on laws
restricting employee political activity and campaign finance
reform. There is a close relationship between these areas and
the field of ethics law. In all three contexts, the goals of equal
access to government, neutrality in public service, and the avoid-
ance of both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety play
fundamental roles.
Part IV focuses on the relationship between National Treasury
and the cases that upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch
Act's restrictions on federal employees' political activity,27 sev-
eral of which have subsequently been removed by statute. The
Court in National Treasury distinguished these cases from the
honoraria ban because they primarily utilized an employee pro-
tection rationale to validate restrictive legislation.28 This Article
argues that this interpretation misreads both the cases and the
statute; the ethics-law concerns that the Court downplayed in
National Treasury were central to the Hatch Act and the cases
upholding it.29
Part V focuses on Buckley v. Valeo. 0 Although the National
Treasury opinion did not cite Buckley, there are important simi-
larities between the two opinions' use of the First Amendment to
invalidate legislation based in part on goals of equalization and
neutrality. As noted above, National Treasury stands as an ap-
parent reaffirmation of Buckley, a fact that will cause little joy
in the ranks of campaign finance reform advocates.
II. NATIONAL TREASURY-A VICTORY FOR GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES, A DEFEAT FOR GOVERNMENT ETHIcS?
A. The Decision
Receipt by government employees of honoraria--essentially
payments for appearances, speeches, or articles-has been a
matter of concern to Congress since the 1970s."' Such payments
27. Id. at 1015-16.
28. Id. at 1015.
29. Id. at 1015-16.
30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
31. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1291
984 [Vol. 37:979
GOVERNMENT ETHICS
present the possibility of the buying and selling of influence: the
payment may not really be made for the matter in question but
in order to purchase the recipient's goodwill. The area in which
these payments drew the most criticism was that of honoraria
for members of Congress itself.3 2 In the late 1980s, two blue-
ribbon commissions addressed the issue and recommended a ban
on all honoraria." Their recommendations went beyond the
legislative branch, however, to encompass receipt of honoraria
"by all officials and employees in all branches of govern-
ment."4 In the 1989 amendments to the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, Congress took this broad approach, declaring that
"[a]n individual may not receive any honorarium while that
individual is a Member, officer or employee." 5 Two unions and
a group of career executive branch employees, primarily of mid-
dle- and lower-rank, challenged the Act on constitutional
grounds. 6 The lower courts agreed with the challenges and
struck down the statute as it applied to all members of the exec-
utive branch. 7
The Supreme Court, by a margin of six to three, affirmed."
Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Stevens presented
the question as a classic example of the government's power to
restrict the expressive activities of its own employees for inter-
nal management purposes, as distinguished from other attempts
to place more general restrictions on citizens' expression in fur-
therance of some social policy.39 He began by emphasizing that
government employment does not cause employees to relinquish
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
32. National Treasury, 990 F.2d at 1278.
33. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1008-09.
34. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FEDERAL ETHIcs LAW REFORM, To SERVE WITH
HONOR 36 (1989). The President's Commission stated that "we recognize that ban-
ning honoraria would have a substantial financial cost to many officials. We feel
strongly, however, that the current ailment is a serious one and that this medicine
is no more bitter than is needed to cure the patient." Id.
35. 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (Supp. V 1993).
36. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1010.
37. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 13
(D.D.C. 1992), affd, 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
38. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1008.
39. Id. at 1013.
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their First Amendment rights.40 As First Amendment guid-
ance, the Court used the line of cases following Pickering v.
Board of Education,41 which dealt with disciplinary actions
against public employees that arose from statements that they
had made. This line of cases established a two-step analysis.
In the first step, the court inquires whether the employee's
statements are about a matter of public concern. If this ques-
tion is answered in the affirmative, the reviewing court must
next "arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employ-
ee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-
cern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."42 In prior cases, the Court often showed consider-
able deference to the government's determination about the
presence of such interests.43
Justice Stevens found that the kind of articles and speeches
covered by the honoraria ban would represent matters of public
concern because similar activities in the past had been "ad-
dressed to a public audience, were made outside the workplace,
and involved content largely unrelated to... government em-
ployment."" The denial of compensation imposed a "significant
burden"45 on this speech, apparently analogous to individual
disciplinary actions. Justice Stevens recognized that the ana-
lytical fit with Pickering was not perfect, inasmuch as National
Treasury involved a generalized restriction on future speech
rather than a specific action based on past speech.4" Nonethe-
less, he found the Pickering balancing approach applicable,
while describing it in a way that indicated that the government
would have a hard time prevailing. He described the Act as a
"wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a mas-
40. Id. at 1012.
41. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
42. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1012 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
43. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
44. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
45. Id. at 1014.
46. Id. at 1013-14 ("Unlike Pickering and its progeny, this case does not involve a
post hoc analysis of one employee's speech and its impact on that employee's public
responsibilities.").
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sive number of potential speakers."" As he described the
government's burden, it seems both qualitatively and quantita-
tively different from what it would be in an individualized disci-
plinary action under Pickering: "The Government must show
that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of
present and future employees in a broad range of present and
future expression are outweighed by that expression's 'necessary
impact on the actual operation' of the Government."48
Congress's side of the burden could not be satisfied by "mere
speculation, " 9 nor would the normal judicial deference to con-
gressional judgments about matters such as the appearance of
integrity within the public service be determinative.0 In this
context, Justice Stevens emphasized that the ban applied to
lower-ranking employees "with negligible power to confer favors
on those who might pay to hear them speak or to read their
articles."51 He also emphasized the lack of a "nexus" require-
ment: the payments could come from persons with no interest in
the employee's government work, and the subject matter might
be unrelated to anything the employee did in government ser-
vice.52 As Justice Stevens pointed out, Congress had utilized
such a nexus approach when it permitted payments for multiple
speeches if there was no connection between the government
employment and the source or the subject of the payment.53 In
sum, he found the honoraria ban "crudely crafted"54 and vio-
lative of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.55
As for the remedy, Justice Stevens disagreed with the action
of the courts below, which invalidated the statute as to all exec-
utive branch employees. 6 The majority noted that no senior-
level executive branch employees were parties and that the
broad remedy would not permit an honoraria ban even when
47. Id. at 1013.
48. Id. at 1014.
49. Id. at 1017.
50. Id. at 1018.
51. Id. at 1016.
52. Id. at 1016-17.
53. Id. at 1016.
54. Id. at 1018.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1018-19.
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nexus concerns were satisfied.57 The Court's solution was to
limit relief to the employees who were plaintiffs.58 The Act's
ban thus continues to apply to senior officials, at least until that
matter is contested. Justice Stevens nevertheless rejected sug-
gestions that the ban, limited by a nexus requirement, be ruled
valid as to all levels. He determined that such action would be
inappropriate judicial legislation.59 Moreover, "[t]he process of
drawing a proper nexus, even more than the defense of the
statute's application to senior employees, would likely raise
independent constitutional concerns whose adjudication is un-
necessary to decide this case.""
Justice O'Connor, who joined with the majority on the merits,
dissented on the remedial point. She would have read a nexus
requirement into the statute, primarily because the lack of one
with respect to middle- and lower-ranking employees was the
statute's principal infirmity.6 She agreed with the majority
that the Act's "broad, prophylactic ban " 2 on payments for non-
work-related speech to rank-and-file employees curbed so much
speech that the government could not sustain the burden of
justifying it.6" The possibility of some under-the-table payments
was not enough, nor was the possibility of an appearance of
impropriety. She was unwilling to let deference to Congress
carry the government's burden on this point, particularly be-
cause the two blue-ribbon commission reports had not specifical-
ly addressed receipt of honoraria by rank-and-file executive
branch employees.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thom-
as, dissented on both the merits and the remedy.6" Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist emphasized the need for deference to the
government's judgments as employer, which the Court had
57. Id. at 1018.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1019.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 1021-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 1024 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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shown both in individual discipline cases and in upholding the
Hatch Act's broad restrictions on partisan activities by federal
employees.66 On the facts before the Court, he would have
shown similar deference to the honoraria ban, particularly given
"the Government's foremost interest-prevention of impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety."' The Chief Justice would
have let Congress draw the line where the two commissions
recommended, even though they did so in general terms." Be-
yond deference to Congress's judgment in drawing lines, he jus-
tified the line drawn by noting that many mid- and lower-level
officials, such as "[tax examiners, bank examiners, [and] en-
forcement officials," are in a position to confer favors.69 Consis-
tent with this observation, he would have limited the relief
sought by such plaintiffs in National Treasury to honoraria that
would not be invalid under a nexus requirement.0
B. National Treasury and First Amendment Analysis
1. Balancing Instead of Rules?
National Treasury is obviously an important First Amend-
ment case. This aspect alone merits considerable attention. An
initial question concerns what light the case sheds on general
questions of First Amendment analysis. In R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul,"' Justice Stevens, the author of National Treasury, called
for a movement away from a First Amendment jurisprudence
purportedly governed by specific categories and concepts." He
viewed, with approval, the Court's decisions as establishing "a
more complex and subtle analysis, one that considers the con-
tent and context of the regulated speech, and the nature and
scope of the restriction on speech." 3 Justice Stevens's reliance
66. Id. at 1025-27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1027 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1027-29 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1031 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
71. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
72. Id. at 417-28 (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Fore-
word: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 88-89 (1992)
(discussing Justice Stevens's opinion in R.A.V.).
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in National Treasury on the Pickering balancing approach, a
classic example of the contextual analysis that he favors, is thus
not surprising. In this respect, it is interesting to compare his
National Treasury opinion with the D.C. Circuit's opinion in the
same case.74 The lower court applied Pickering, but it also re-
lied heavily on the classic First Amendment concepts of "over-
breadth" and "narrow tailoring."" These concepts appeared on-
ly peripherally in the text of Justice Stevens's opinion, in the
discussion of remedy, essentially after the merits had been re-
solved.7" However, as I develop below, his seemingly contextual,
balancing conclusion can easily be restated as a rule, imposing
on the government the concepts of heightened scrutiny, strong
governmental interest, and narrow tailoring.77
2. The Demise of "Public Concern?"
Justice Stevens demonstrated the persistence of categories in
First Amendment analysis by beginning his application of
Pickering with a discussion of one such category: whether the
employees' speech affected by the honoraria ban fell within the
rubric of "matters of public concern.""s Pickering recognized
public employees' retention of "the First Amendment rights they
would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of
public interest."7 9 Since Pickering, the Court's view of what con-
stitutes such matters has undergone considerable transforma-
tion. Obviously, the concept can play a limiting role in determin-
ing what public employees can speak about without fear of retal-
iation. Connick v. Myers,"0 an early post-Pickering case, took a
pro-employer stand, in part by emphasizing the concept's deriva-
tion from "the Constitution's special concern with threats to the
74. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.
1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
75. Id. at 1274-75.
76. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1018
(1995).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 133-41.
78. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
79. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
80. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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right of citizens to participate in political affairs."8
In the later case of Rankin v. McPherson,82 Justice Scalia, in
his dissent, attempted to keep the concept a narrow one, empha-
sizing its close relation to core First Amendment values concern-
ing participation in the political process." In Rankin, an em-
ployee of a constable's office had commented favorably on the at-
tempt to assassinate President Reagan.' Despite the strictures
of Justice Scalia and three of his colleagues, the majority had no
difficulty finding the statement to be on matters of public con-
cern. For example, Justice Marshall noted that "[iut came on the
heels of a news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of
heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the Presi-
dent."85 This view of public concern led Justice Scalia to hy-
pothesize that a threat "to blow up the local federal building"
would also be entitled to First Amendment protection from disci-
pline because the public would be concerned about it.
86
Not surprisingly, the lower courts have found the public con-
cern analysis difficult to apply coherently." Examples abound,
such as the case in which the district court and court of appeals
differed over whether statements by an athletic director about a
school's athletic eligibility met the public concern test.88 Part of
the problem is that the public may well be interested in any-
thing that goes on in a pgublic agency or institution.89 Moreover,
it is easy to argue for protecting the employees' rights to speak
about all such matters, for employees are in the best position to
know what happens.9 0 Coffee break gossip and griping thus can
easily be elevated to the level of constitutionally protected
speech. Perhaps such discourse merits protection not because of
the need to protect the political process but because of the self-
81. Id. at 145.
82. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
83. Id. at 395 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 381.
85. Id. at 386.
86. Id. at 398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. See Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 423 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995).
88. Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
89. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
90. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994).
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realization that all people enjoy when they are able to speak
freely on a range of subjects."'
Justice Stevens's opinion in National Treasury, which treated
the speech at issue as almost automatically involving matters of
public concern, may represent a further watering down of the
concept. One cannot know with any precision what the persons
subject to the honoraria ban would have said or written. In-
deed, the "test" may now be that, excepting what National
Treasury called "employee comment on matters related to per-
sonal status in the workplace,"92 everything that a public em-
ployee says is deemed to be on a matter of public concern. Per-
haps Justice Stevens was laying the groundwork for the next
step of abandoning the concept altogether, a prospect that
would satisfy some academic critics. 3 This prospect also would
resolve the difficult conceptual problem of whether speech out-
side the public concern realm enjoys no constitutional protec-
tion. 4 Justice Stevens's desire to emphasize a contextual ap-
proach to First Amendment issues may be satisfied, however,
by retaining some notion of public concern in a highly watered-
down, sliding-scale form. Connick already had presaged such a
development, stating that "the State's burden in justifying a
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the
employee's expression.""
3. Will the Court's Employee Speech Decisions Now Tilt in a
Pro-Employee Direction?
Whether or not the public concern test has been totally aban-
doned, its continued dilution represents a clear victory for the
free speech rights of public employees. The question that natu-
91. See Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611,
1769 (1984) [hereinafter Developments-Public Employment].
92. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013
(1995).
93. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils
of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. RFV. 1, 55 (1990)
(noting that "[t]he public concern test rests on an unduly constricted vision of public
discourse").
94. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 n.7 (1987).
95. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).
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rally arises is whether National Treasury represents a general-
ized pro-employee tilt in the Court's employee speech doctrine.
Until now, the results have been mixed but, if anything, have
tilted somewhat in a pro-employer direction. Some criticized the
five-to-four decision in Connick on this ground,96 while the five-
to-four decision in Rankin goes the other way." Prior to Na-
tional Treasury, the Court's most recent pronouncement on the
subject came in Waters v. Churchill." Waters involved the nar-
row issue of the extent to which the First Amendment requires a
public employer to ascertain precisely what its employee said
before taking disciplinary action based on the employee's
speech.9 On this issue, the Court took a pro-employee tack,
holding that the employer must engage in a reasonable investi-
gation.00 Nevertheless, the Court, over a dissent by Justice
Stevens, also held that the employer's ultimate findings need
only be reasonable, not correct.'
On the general issue of government-employer power, the
Court's opinion emphasized the need for deference to employer
decisions about potential disruptions of the public service.0 2
According to Justice O'Connor, the "extra power the government
has in this area comes from the nature of the government's mis-
sion as employer. Government agencies are charged by law with
doing particular tasks."0 3 Employees' rights must be subordi-
nated so that the government can accomplish its basic mission.
One should recognize that this analysis does not carry over to
the rights of the citizenry-at-large. Much of constitutional law
consists of blocking what the government perceives as its mis-
sion in order to protect those rights. As cases like Waters indi-
cate, public employee rights may be of a different, and lower,
order. 104
96. Developments-Public Employment, supra note 91, at 1756.
97. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378.
98. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
99. Id. at 1888-90.
100. Id. at 1889.
101. Id. at 1890.
102. Id. at 1887.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1886.
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The extent to which Waters represents a pro-employer tilt can
be seen in the latest installment of the litigation between Doctor
Leonard Jeffries and officials of the City University of New
York.' The university disciplined Jeffries for allegedly mak-
ing anti-Semitic remarks; Jeffries then sued for reinstatement
and damages. 10 6 After a partial victory for Jeffries in the lower
courts, the Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions
to reconsider it in light of Waters.0 7 On remand, the Second
Circuit directed judgment for the defendants, emphasizing the
deferential thrust of Waters and stating that "even when the
speech is squarely on public issues-and thus earns the greatest
constitutional protection-Waters indicates that the
government's burden is to make a substantial showing of likely
interference, not of an actual disruption."108
The lower court got the right message from Waters, but does
National Treasury send a different one? Has the pendulum
swung back toward Rankin? In my view, the answer is "no." The
key is the fundamental difference between the individualized
nature of the determinations in the Pickering cases and the
generalized restriction on speech at issue in National Treasury.
Despite the Court's insistence that Pickering could simply be
transposed- to the latter context, the presence of a generalized
ban triggered some basic First Amendment concerns and princi-
ples, even though the language of balancing partially concealed
them.0 9 When these principles reappeared, deference was rele-
gated to a secondary role.
4. Transposing the Pickering Approach to a Generalized
Restriction-Some Problems
The majority in National Treasury, as well as the concurrence
and dissent, analyzed the honoraria ban by utilizing the
105. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994),
rev'd, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 1241.
107. Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502, 503 (1994).
108. Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted).
109. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1012-15
(1995).
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Pickering approach."0 That case and its progeny, however, all
dealt with individual disciplinary actions based on a public
employee's speech."' Justice Stevens recognized that there was
a conceptual difference between cases of this sort and a general-
ized ban on future conduct."' The difference is substantial. In
the generalized context, a reviewing court has to speculate as to
the types of conduct that might occur, the impact that they
might have on the various interests present, and the relative
weights of those interests. One can call this balancing, but it is
very different from analyzing, after the fact, public employer X's
dismissal of public employee Y for a specific remark."'
In his generalized application of Pickering to the honoraria
ban problem, Justice Stevens emphasized the ban's "wholesale
deterrent to a broad category of expression by a massive number
of potential speakers.""' He also invoked the interests of the
audiences of that future speech." 5 Taking them together, Jus-
tice Stevens was able to posit the existence of a set of interests
of considerable magnitude: "the interests of both potential audi-
ences and a vast group of present and future employees in a
broad range of present and future expression."1
6
Although Justice Stevens was willing to speculate about the
"enormous quantity""' of speech deterred and the chilling ef-
110. Id. at 1013-15, 1020, 1025.
111. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1883 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 381-82 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1983);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).
112. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
Unlike Pickering and its progeny, this case does not involve a post hoc
analysis of one employee's speech and its impact on that employee's pub-
lic responsibilities. Rather, the Government asks us to apply Pickering to
Congress' wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a
massive number of potential speakers.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. But see id. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(partially agreeing with distinction but stating that "[io draw the line based on a
distinction between ex ante rules and ex post punishments . . . overgeneralizes and
threatens undue interference with 'the government's mission as employer") (quoting
Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887).
114. Id. at 1013.
115. Id. at 1014.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1013 n.11.
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fect of the ban,"' he would not allow the government to engage
in speculation about the existence and strength of its inter-
est.119 He quoted precedent dealing with regulation of private
conduct for the proposition that the government "must do more
than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be
cured.' ... It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real,
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alle-
viate these harms in a direct and material way."2 ' Justice
Stevens's formulation in National Treasury suggests that poten-
tial burdens on expression must be outweighed by that
expression's "'necessary impact on the actual operation' of the
Government." 2'
What harm could the government show? Justice Stevens dis-
missed any possibility of workplace disruption, at least with
respect to honoraria for speech outside the workplace and not re-
lating to the speaker's government employment. He also dis-
missed efficiency/morale arguments, like those the Court used to
uphold the Hatch Act, on the ground that the Hatch Act focused
on employee protection from partisan retribution and that
"[u]nlike partisan political activity... honoraria hardly appear
to threaten employees' morale or liberty."'22 He viewed as the
government's strongest argument the possible misuse of power
or the appearance of misuse through the taking of under-the-ta-
ble payments.'2 ' While this might be true for legislators and
high-ranking executive branch officials, however, he dismissed it
as speculative and unsupported by evidence with respect to
other executive branch officials-the plaintiffs in National
Treasury."24
Justice Stevens regarded any remaining arguments for a
"wholesale prophylactic rule" as justified primarily by adminis-
118. Id. at 1014 (noting that, "unlike an adverse action taken in response to actual
speech, this ban chills potential speech before it happens").
119. Id. at 1013 n.11.
120. Id. at 1017 (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2450 (1994)) (alteration in original).
121. Id. at 1014 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968))
(emphasis added).
122. Id. at 1015.
123. Id. at 1015-16.
124. Id. at 1016.
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trative convenience.'25  This argument was nevertheless
weakened by the fact that the amended regulations had con-
tained a requirement of a nexus between the speech and the
employee's work when the employee's speech was a part of a
series of articles or speeches. 6 For Justice Stevens, this
showed that the government was capable of reaching the core
problem of under-the-table purchases of influence, or the appear-
ance thereof, without sweeping so broadly. 7
Apparently, Justice Stevens found the broad sweep of the ban
to be its most troubling aspect. He referred to the ban as a
"crudely crafted burden""~ and noted that the lower court had
invalidated it because 'it was not as carefully tailored as it
should have been."' The dissenters relied on precedent, par-
ticularly on Pickering and the Hatch Act cases, 3 ' and the con-
cepts of deference to Congress in its regulation of the federal
service and the importance of preventing impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety. 3' As I develop below,' both of
these concepts suggest judicial tolerance toward the use of
broad prophylactic measures. Indeed, such forms of regulation
are staples of ethics law. National Treasury calls them both into
question.
At this point, however, one should focus on the similarity
between Justice Stevens's purported Pickering balancing test
and classic First Amendment analysis. As the dissenters pointed
out, the former is supposed to be easier for the government to
satisfy than the latter.' For example, great deference to pub-
lic employer decisions is a hallmark of Pickering decisions.""
Some forms of economic and social legislation get broad defer-
ence as well,'35 but laws restricting speech do not. These laws
125. Id. at 1017.
126. Id. at 1016.
127. Id. at 1016-17.
128. Id. at 1018.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1025-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1027 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 172-88.
133. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1025 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983).
135. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 375 (4th
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encounter such concepts as overbreadth challenges and compel-
ling state interest and narrow tailoring requirements. 136 Al-
though the terminology is either absent or plays a secondary
role, Justice Stevens's approach in National Treasury takes
many of these tacks. The invocation of unknown speeches and
audiences without any nexus to the speaker's work 137 amounts
to a facial challenge for overbreadth. The large amount of speech
that the government must justify suppressing puts it in the posi-
tion of having to show something like a compelling state inter-
est."'8 Most importantly, requiring a nexus to ensure that the
government regulates only speech representing dangers that the
government may reach is a classic utilization of the First
Amendment narrow tailoring requirement. 139 I will leave to
others the issue of whether Justice Stevens's balancing approach
to First Amendment issues is, conceptually, a major departure
from a more categorical form of analysis. "' At least in Nation-
al Treasury, they look alike.' Before turning to the clash be-
tween this case and ethics-law analysis,' an important relat-
ed question will be addressed: whether the decision marks a
major step towards recognizing in public employees the full
panoply of rights enjoyed by other citizens. A court's views as to
the nature and extent of public employees' rights will- play a
ed. 1991) ("The Court's turnabout from the Lochner era became complete with the
Williamson decision."); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 490-91
(1955) (upholding restrictions on the fitting, duplication, and replacement of frame
lenses and other optical appliances).
136. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118-23 (1991). These concepts played an important role in the decision below.
See National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1273-75
(D.C. Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
137. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1018.
138. Cf. id. at 1017 (noting that "[t]he fact that § 501 singles out expressive activi-
ty for special regulation heightens the Government's burden of justification"). The
Court supported this statement by citation to a case applying the compelling state
interest standard. Id. (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583 (1983)).
139. National Treasury, 990 F.2d at 1275-76.
140. See Sullivan, supra note 73, at 88-89.
141. Moreover, the similarity is bolstered by the fact that the majority cited a
number of classic First Amendment cases. See National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at
1017.
142. See text infra part II.D.
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large role in its evaluation and construction of the ethics laws
affecting them.
C. National Treasury and the Constitutional Status of Public
Employees
The Pickering approach to public employee dismissals could
lead in either a pro-employee or a pro-employer direction.'
Courts have viewed it, however, as resting on pro-employer
premises'" and leading to results more deferential to the gov-
ernment than would be the case under general First Amend-
ment principles. 45 National Treasury's apparent melding of
the two lines of analysis raises the broader question of whether
the Court is prepared to revisit the issue of the constitutional
status of public employees. 4 Over the years, the Court has
changed position on this matter more than once, with decisions
spanning a spectrum from relegating public employees to a defi-
nite subordinate position to treating them like all other
citizens. 4
The notion of public employees' enjoying fewer rights histori-
cally was based on the rights-privilege distinction.' Govern-
ment employment was viewed as a privilege that could be condi-
tioned on the surrender of rights. " 9 More recent justifications
for according public employees fewer constitutional rights have
focused primarily on the nature of the government's role as
employer. Justice O'Connor articulated the latter rationale in
143. Developments-Public Employment, supra note 91, at 1748-49. In the view of
this commentator, the Pickering test is neutral on its face, but the current Court's
scale of values tends to lead to pro-employer decisions.
144. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994).
145. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1012 (noting that Pickering permits restraint
of public employee speech "that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the
public at large").
146. Cf. id. at 1027 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for relying
on cases regulating the speech of private actors).
147. Developments-Public Employment, supra note 91, at 1738-39.
148. See generally id. at 1739-44 (discussing the emergence and development of the
rights-privilege doctrine over the course of the twentieth century).
149. E.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892)
(discussing government employment as a privilege that may require surrender of
certain constitutional rights); see Developments-Public Employment, supra note 91,
at 1742-43 (discussing pre-Warren Court views).
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Waters v. Churchill.15 The well-being of all of society depends
on government's successful accomplishment of the tasks with
which society has charged it. The interests and rights of public
employees thus must be subordinated to the achievement of
these goals.'51 One may also articulate a fiduciary status ratio-
nale for this subordination that focuses on the role and responsi-
bilities of the employees.
Above all, public employees must be neutral and willing to put
aside self-interest to perform their duties impartially.
We the People entrust public power to elected and appointed
officials for the purpose of furthering the public interest. To
accept that power is to undertake a commitment that it will
be used only for this purpose, and not to advance the narrow
interest of self or of any other person or group."2
Although one can easily advance such justifications, the nagging
question remains whether it is fair to make public employees
give up the panoply of constitutional rights that all other citi-
zens enjoy. Over the years, many have insisted that it is not fair
to make such a demand. Justice Black, for example, denounced
the Hatch Act's restrictions on public employees' political activi-
ty as creating a kind of second-class citizenship.'53 Recent
analyses have focused on the importance of recognizing and
protecting the employees' private and personal spheres to the
greatest extent possible." This approach can be justified both
as maximizing the protective role of important constitutional
rights intended to be available to all and as enhancing the at-
tractiveness of government service.
150. 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886-88 (1994).
151. See id. at 1888 ("The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at
large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing some-
one for the very purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well
be appropriate.").
152. Farina, supra note 5, at 292; see Nolan, supra note 8, at 71.
153. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 111-12 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
154. Nolan, supra note 8, at 144 ("The rule of justified regulation assumes that
public servants are individual citizens first, and government employees second. The
rule requires us to consider their liberties and interests in being free of unnecessary
regulation before we control private aspects of their lives in the name of public
welfare.").
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Taken to its furthest point, this approach represents what one
commentator has called the "individual rights vision" of public
employment.'55 The same commentator views the current
Court as having backed away from this vision, towards a middle
ground between it and truly second-class status.'56 When the
government attempts to restrict the rights of public employees,
the employees win some of the time. National Treasury is con-
sistent with this analysis and with the perception that the Court
is somewhat ambivalent about the entire issue. The employees
won, but Justice Stevens's opinion states at least that the gov-
ernment will also win in those cases in which it can make the
required showing.' The general widespread nature of the ban
obviously was key to the outcome. Whether an equally broad
ban with some sort of nexus requirement would survive a chal-
lenge remains open.'58
Rather than representing a victory for the constitutional
rights of all government employees, perhaps National Treasury
represents a victory for the rights of some employees-those
middle- and lower-rank executive branch employees whom the
plaintiffs represented. Justice Stevens's opinion referred several
times to the different problem that honoraria for high-ranking
officials might present.'59 National Treasury may then repre-
sent a call upon Congress to differentiate more carefully among
the status and responsibilities of public employees before re-
stricting the rights that those employees would otherwise enjoy
as citizens. The Court already had taken such a nuanced ap-
proach in Rankin v. McPherson,"O an employee-speech dis-
155. Developments-Public Employment, supra note 91, at 1739.
156. See id. at 1747-49.
157. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1012-13
(1995).
158. Id. at 1019.
159. Id. at 1014, 1016, 1019. Justice Stevens noted that:
Congress reasonably could assume that payments of honoraria to judges
or high-ranking officials in the Executive Branch might generate a simi-
lar appearance of improper influence. Congress could not, however, rea-
sonably extend that assumption to all federal employees below Grade GS-
16, an immense class of workers with negligible power to confer favors
on those who might pay to hear them speak or to read their articles.
Id. at 1016.
160. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
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missal case, and in Elrod v. Burns,'' a case involving patronage
hiring and dismissals. 16 2 One might argue for a presumption
that all public employees should be treated alike, 6' but many
have argued for, in effect, making the presumption rebutta-
ble."M The differentiation approach preserves elements of sec-
ond-class citizenship in that it permits the abridgment of some
employees' rights. The approach thus strikes a midpoint between
two categorical visions that is consistent with Pickering and
with the Court's desire to balance the interests on both sides. I
view this as a desirable general approach but question whether
the Court applied it correctly in National Treasury.
D. National Treasury-An Ethics-Law Appraisal
Things certainly may be said in favor of National Treasury,
both in terms of its specific result and its broader implications.
The honoraria ban at issue did have an extraordinarily broad
sweep, catching in its net many instances of compensated speech
that would pose no danger to any of the values that Congress
might have sought to protect.'65 The case serves as a reminder
to Congress that the First Amendment establishes an outer
boundary to the reach of prophylactic statutes. It also serves as
a reminder that public employees do not automatically relin-
quish their constitutional rights upon employment. Within the
overall field of ethics, the decision will reinforce the arguments
of those who have warned against a tendency to overregulate
the matter.'66 Perhaps National Treasury's greatest long-term
161. 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976) (involving differentiation among status of public
employees). Contra United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947) (re-
fusing to impose differentiation requirement on Congress).
162. See Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (combining Rankin and
Elrod analyses).
163. See Farina, supra note 5, at 301.
164. Id. at 293, 309, 322; Nolan, supra note 8, at 110, 141.
165. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003,
1020-21 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Farina,
supra note 5, at 316-17; Nolan, supra note 8, at 107-10.
166. See Farina, supra note 5, at 290-91; Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government
and the Vision of Public Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 419 (1990). For an
excellent treatment of the issue, see Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in
Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57.
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impact will come from its emphasis on a more nuanced approach
to ethics regulation. 7 and the concept of tailoring. Having said
all this, however, there is much in the decision that gives me
pause.
As a starting point, one should note that those who successful-
ly invoked the judicial process in National Treasury are not
some discrete, insular minority in need of protection from the
courts because they have nowhere else to turn.1" Public em-
ployees are a powerful political lobby in Washington and else-
where. In 1993, they succeeded in loosening the Hatch Act's re-
strictions.'69 Indeed, when the Court handed down National
Treasury, federal employee groups were in the process of trying
to get Congress to accomplish the same result, an attempt that
was seen as likely to bear fruit.70 I do not mean to suggest
barring the courthouse door to powerful plaintiffs, but the Court
might have modified its balancing exercise to take into account
the relative strengths of the contending interests. In a sense,
"the government" was regulating itself, given that the ban ap-
plied across the board to employees of all three branches, includ-
ing the elected representatives who passed it.' 7 '
A more fundamental criticism is the majority's relative lack of
concern with what I refer to as the ethics-law dimensions of the
statute. At times, Justice Stevens seemed to view the problem as
one of management. He referred to the potential expression's
"impact on the actual operation" 2 of the government and re-
167. E.g., Farina, supra note 5, at 293 (discussing intra- and interbranch dis-
tinctions in the formulation of ethical principles).
168. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
169. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7353 (Supp. V 1993); Paula Galowitz, Restrictions on
Lobbying by Legal Services Attorneys: Redefining Professional Norms and Obligations,
4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 98 n.303 (1994).
170. See Nolan, supra note 8, at 107-08 & n.188 (discussing proposed Ethics in
Government Act Amendments of 1991, H.R. 3341, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
171. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-505. One should note that this amendment was accom-
panied by a substantial pay increase for members of Congress, federal judges, and
executive branch employees above the salary grade GS-15. See United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1009 (1995). The fact that the
class of persons bringing the suit to challenge the honoraria ban was composed of
individuals who did not share in the salary increase is significant.
172. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)) (emphasis added).
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ferred to the governmental interest in "operational efficien-
cy." 173 Although the individual discipline cases on which Jus-
tice Stevens drew were primarily concerned with such manage-
ment matters as the potential for office disruption,'74 he noted
that the ban challenged in National Treasury was not aimed at
disruption. It went beyond any such managerial concerns as
"efficiency" to the separate and distinct realm of ethics. Ethics-
based concerns about the operation of government may implicate
efficiency, but they rest on and advance broader values, particu-
larly "(1) protecting the integrity of services provided to the
government; (2) avoiding the appearance of conflicts or misuse of
government position; and (3) protecting private citizens from
having to pay extraordinary fees to receive ordinary government
services."'75
Justice Stevens recognized, perhaps grudgingly, 7 ' the force
of such concerns. In the context of National Treasury, some of
the people paying honoraria may well have paid for access. Some
of the people receiving them may well have provided it. The big-
gest problem with the entire practice, approached from the gen-
eralized perspective that the Court employed,'77 is that of ap-
pearances. As Judge Sentelle's lower court dissent noted:
All the public sees are employees, entrusted with carrying
out the business of the government, receiving substantial
payments from entities outside of the government-the public
173. Id. at 1016.
174. In cases such as Connick, Rankin, and Waters, the employers focused on the
potential effects of the speech on office morale. The possibility always remains, how-
ever, that broader issues of a public office's image will be drawn into play. See
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 400 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that
statements made concerning possible assassination of the President "might also, to
put it mildly, undermine public confidence in the Constable's office").
175. Nolan, supra note 8, at 71-72.
176. For example, he characterized the government's interest in concerns about ap-
pearances as "undeniably powerful," but he completely discounted the role of the
Hatch Act cases in validating such concerns. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016.
177. The Court's approach amounts to a form of overbreadth analysis, although
there was surprisingly little discussion of the validity of this approach. Compare id.
at 1013-14 (holding that, on account of the disputed statute's broad sweep, "the
Government's burden is greater ... than with respect to an isolated disciplinary
action") with Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (fo-
cusing on determinations of potential overbreadth of a federal statute).
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may not pause to consider whether there is a relationship
between the payor and payee or the activity for which the
honorarium is paid and the payee's job. 78
As a matter of ethics law, the statute at issue in National
Treasury dealt with a potentially serious appearances problem.
Public cynicism about government employees is almost certainly
not limited to those employees in high positions. As a matter of
judicial review of legislation, the question becomes how to con-
struct a balancing test that gives adequate weight to the
government's concern about cases in which there is only an
appearance of impropriety. Two key concepts can help carry the
government's burden on this issue: deference to Congress and
the notion that prophylactic legislation is sometimes necessary.
Justice Stevens gave short shrift to both.
In the individual discipline cases, deference to the employer
had played an important role.'79 When it came to Congress's
enactment of a general ban, that concept was not triggered, in
part because of a lack of evidence that would support a ban
extending to all levels 80 and in part because of a "powerful
and realistic presumption that the federal work force consists of
dedicated and honorable civil servants." 8' Nevertheless, if the
issue really is a question of how the public perceives particular
practices on the part of those employees, Congress is in a far
better position than the judiciary to make that judgment. Its
members are in constant touch with the public, and ethics issues
are one of the things they hear about the most.
As for the use of broad prophylactic rules, Justice Stevens
analyzed the issue essentially as a matter of "administrative
convenience" and ease of enforcement;'82 however, these rules
serve a broader function. "Inherent in the very nature of such a
rule is the concept that the evil to be avoided has not yet oc-
curred."" Indeed, it may never occur. In the landmark federal
178. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
179. E.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983); see National Treasury,
115 S. Ct. at 1017-18 n.21.
180. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016.
181. Id. at 1018.
182. Id. at 1017.
183. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1288
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ethics case of United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,
the Court stated that the ethics statute in question "establishes
an objective standard of conduct, and.., whenever a govern-
ment agent fails to act in accordance with that standard, he is
guilty of violating the statute, regardless of whether there is
positive corruption. The statute is thus directed not only at dis-
honor, but also at conduct that tempts dishonor."' Prophylac-
tic statutes play a particularly important role in the area of eth-
ics. There is a substantial danger of hidden misconduct;" it is
important to remove temptation before the detrimental acts can
occur, 18 and the public needs constant assurance that the gov-
ernment generally is above suspicion. 8 '
One might still justify National Treasury on the straightfor-
ward grounds that notions of deference to the legislature cannot
push aside the First Amendment and that the First
Amendment's force overrides concerns of ease in legislative
draftsmanship. This, however, is what narrow tailoring is all
about. Indeed, the Court previously has pointed in this direction
when it has grappled with tensions between prophylactic rules
and the First Amendment. 8 ' There are, in my view, two seri-
ous flaws with these contentions. The first is the premise of
National Treasury that a lessened degree of First Amendment
protection is in operation. The question is how to apply a balanc-
ing test-not a set of absolute rules-in which the government's
n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995); see
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) ("The Rules prohibiting
solicitation are prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention of harm
before it occurs.").
184. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549 (1961).
185. See Ann McBride, Ethics in Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 451, 460 (1990).
186. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 550.
187. Cf. Farina, supra note 5, at 292 (quoting Daniel Webster's statement that,
"jiun a government like ours, entirely popular, care should be taken in every part of
the system, not only to do right, but to satisfy the community that right is done").
For a challenge to a somewhat different regulation of payments related to honoraria,
see Sanjour v. EPA, 984 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 997 F.2d 1584 (1993).
188. E.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1796 (1993) (holding that ban on
solicitation by certified public accountants is prophylactic rule and that State failed
to show requisite interest to withstand First Amendment challenge); see NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free ex-
pression are suspect.").
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interest in preserving ethical standards must be given some
weight. Prophylactic rules are an important means to further
this goal. I would go further and advance a second, quasi-consti-
tutional justification. Ethics statutes perform a vital function in
a democratic society. By preserving the people's confidence that
the government really is their government, ethics laws reinforce
the legitimacy of all public institutions."9 Viewed in this light,
they deserve, even in prophylactic form, a heightened degree of
weight in any constitutional balancing test.
The analysis in this subsection suggests some fundamental
tensions between ethics-law precepts and National Treasury.
Perhaps a degree of reconciliation is possible along the following
lines. Justice Stevens's opinion suggests that the Court would
uphold an honoraria ban if the ban required a "nexus... be-
tween the author's employment and either the subject matter of
the expression or the identity of the payor." s° Nevertheless,
even a nexus requirement is a form of prophylactic rule. People
who pay an employee to talk about her work may not be trying
to curry favor.'9 ' Even payors who deal with that employee
simply may wish to pay her the going rate that any other speak-
er would receive. A nexus ban says "no" to these innocent mo-
tives, based on classic ethics-law principles.
The basic legislative approach to enforcing these principles
remains intact. National Treasury can thus be viewed simply as
an extreme example, a necessary and correct decision about
outer limits and the need to observe them. I favor a more nu-
anced approach to drafting ethics rules, a point elaborated in
189. See Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 562.
The statute is directed at an evil which endangers the very fabric of a
democratic society, for a democracy is effective only if the people have
faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when
high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse sus-
picions of malfeasance and corruption.
Id.; see also Nolan, supra note 8, at 71-72. For a discussion of this argument in a
different constitutional context, see Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause As a
Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367,
424-35 (1989).
190. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1016
(1995); see id. at 1016-17.
191. Here, however, the related principle of nonsupplementation of public employee
salaries, itself a prophylactic rule, comes into play. See 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1994).
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Part III.D. Nevertheless, National Treasury is more than a
drafting primer. It is a constitutional decision, which the legisla-
tive branch cannot override, in an area in which deference to the
legislature seems particularly important. To further put this
aspect of the decision in context, it may be helpful to contrast it
with another major decision of the 1994 Term, United States v.
Lopez.
192
E. National Treasury, Deference to Congress, and the "Radical"
Lopez Decision
National Treasury was not the only case involving significant
questions of judicial deference to Congress before the Court last
Term. In United States v. Lopez, 9' the Court struck down the
Federal Gun-Free Zone Act of 1990.1' At the heart of the case
is a deep division over how much deference the judiciary should
accord to Congress's implicit conclusion that widespread gun-
related violence in schools has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
treated the question of effect on commerce as ultimately a mat-
ter for judicial resolution.' 9 He found in the rational basis test
room for judicial action rather than abdication.' 9 The dissent-
ers, notably Justice Breyer, 97 emphasized the Court's long-
standing practice of deferring to Congress on matters concerning
the Commerce Clause.
198
National Treasury and Lopez can be read as significant sign-
posts pointing away from judicial deference in fields in which
deference had been accepted practice. Between the two cases,
every Justice was willing to join in a result that not only reex-
amined Congress's factual conclusions but reached different
ones."' In Lopez, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist de-
192. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
193. Id.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
195. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
196. Id. at 1633-34.
197. Id. at 1657-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624; United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
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scribed the statute as having "nothing to do with 'commerce' or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms.""' In National Treasury, Justice Stevens
both noted the lack of "evidence"20" before Congress and ex-
pressed "serious doubt"0 2 about the efficacy of the honoraria
ban. The dissenters in each case called for deference. In Lopez,
Justice Breyer saw the matter as one requiring "an empirical
judgment of a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court
to make with accuracy."0 3 In National Treasuy, Chief Justice
Rehnquist chastised the Court for engaging in "unsupported
factfinding to justify its conclusion."0 4
Of course, the contexts of the two cases are different; Lopez
involved the extent of Congress's commerce power, while Nation-
al Treasury involved Congress's power over the federal public
service. Nevertheless, the differences emphasize the similarity;
when Justices who prize a particular constitutional value see it
as threatened by a particular congressional statute, they will
forego their advocacy of deference to Congress in other contexts,
even though precedent calls for deference in both contexts.
In Lopez, the majority saw the value at issue as federalism.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, concurring, reiterated the im-
portance of the availability of judicial review to protect federal-
ism values.0 ' Standing up for federalism, however, means
standing up to Congress. Justice Stevens viewed the Lopez effort
as "radical," "' mindful no doubt of the broad scope of
Congress's commerce power. When the First Amendment was
the value at issue, however, he engaged in the probing review of
his National Treasury majority opinion. One must note that
rational basis review is not the proper standard for review of
First Amendment claims.0 7 If the subject matter is character-
200. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
201. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1016.
202. Id.
203. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1027 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
205. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 597 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ized as Congress's power over the public service, however, there
is substantial authority for a high degree of deference." 8
The lesson drawn from these cases is that rules of deference
are, not surprisingly, far from immutable. They vary with the
whole context and with the constitutional principle at stake.
Lopez is the more dramatic case inasmuch as there were two
constitutional values in direct opposition-federalism and na-
tional power under the Commerce Clause. No such symmetry
existed in National Treasury. In addition, the balancing present
in National Treasury is absent from Lopez.
Other differences are also evident. Much of the discussion in
Lopez focused on whether congressional findings would affect the
decision,0 9 while in National Treasury the Justices disagreed
over how much credit should attach to evidence Congress ap-
peared to have relied upon.210 One might even quibble over
whether the two cases presented similar factual issues. Perhaps
an activity's effect on commerce is a mixed question of law and
fact calling for more judicial inquiry than the effect of honoraria
on the public service. What counts, I think, is the lesson about
the mutability of deference to be drawn from the two cases. The
invocations, on all sides, of Marbury v. Madison2 . and Gibbons
v. Ogden212 in the several Lopez opinions show how much the
current Court is at odds over first principles. The issue of when
and how much deference to apply surely is one of the questions
at issue.
For those in the legislative branch, the specific lesson is that
the Court may subject their efforts to greater scrutiny in areas
previously viewed as relatively shielded from it. In the case of
ethics statutes, this point extends to state legislatures as well.
208. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 566 (deferring to "the joint judgment of the
Executive and Congress").
209. See, e.g., Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1655-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
210. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct.
1003, 1021 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Neither
report noted any problems, anecdotal or otherwise, stemming from the receipt of
honoraria by rank-and-file Executive Branch employees. Neither report, therefore,
tends to substantiate the Government's administrative efficiency argument, which
presumes that abuses may be so widespread as to justify a prophylactic rule.").
211. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
212. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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One can see in National Treasury a harbinger of more exacting
judicial review of a variety of ethics statutes on both federal
and state levels. The next section of this Article explores some
of the decision's possible ramifications for existing and poten-
tial laws. Although I begin with constitutional issues, I suggest
that its emphasis on tailoring may have an equally great effect
in the nonconstitutional areas of construction, drafting, and
implementation.
III. NATIONAL TREASURY AND THE FUTURE OF ETHICS LAWS
A. Employee Speech Issues After National Treasury-Some
Initial Problems
The first place to look for National Treasury's impact on ethics
laws is the area of employee speech and, specifically, the ques-
tion of what sort of honoraria ban can be enacted. Despite his
apparent approval of the nexus approach,213 Justice Stevens
left this issue somewhat open in the remedial portion of his
opinion. He declined to engraft a nexus requirement onto the
honoraria ban in part because "[t]he process of drawing a proper
nexus... would likely raise independent constitutional ques-
tions whose adjudication is unnecessary to decide this case."'214
The nature of these questions is not immediately apparent,
given that a ban on honoraria when either the payor or the
subject is related to the employee's work had been addressed in
the opinion and represents a prototypical ethics statute.215
Questions would remain at the margin, such as whether employ-
ment relatedness means that the employee must actually have
worked on the matter, that the matter was within the broader
scope of her potential responsibilities, or that the matter was
within the general area for which her department was responsi-
ble.2"6 I will assume that Justice Stevens is referring to issues
213. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1017.
214. Id. at 1019.
215. Id. at 1012.
216. For example, current Office of Government Ethics regulations deal with
"teaching, speaking or writing that relates to the employee's official duties." 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.807(a) (1995). In the case of a noncareer employee, the restrictions extend to
"the general subject matter, industry, or economic sector primarily affected by the
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of this second-order variety.
Other instances arise in which ethics provisions may bar or
limit compensated employee speech. National Treasury makes it
clear that the fact of compensation does not remove First
Amendment protection and may not significantly lessen it.217
The American Bar Association Committee on Government Stan-
dards has criticized regulations promulgated by the Office of
Government Ethics for "an expansive conception-and limita-
tion--of compensated speaking, writing or teaching that 'relates
to' the employee's job."21 Whether such regulations would be
challenged in a judicial context sufficiently generalized to trigger
National Treasury's form of "facial" or overbreadth analysis
remains unclear.219 Legislators who write ethics laws and ad-
ministrators who promulgate regulations to implement them
nevertheless need to keep National Treasury front and center. A
specific example from the current federal regulations sheds light
on how it might apply.
In order to prevent the appearance of government favoritism
as well as the exploitation of public office, the current regula-
tions place severe limits on federal employees' use of their title
in outside activities."' Thus, "[an Assistant Attorney General
may not use his official title or refer to his Government position
in a book jacket endorsement of a novel about organized crime
written by an author whose work he admires. Nor may he do so
in a book review published in a newspaper."22
After National Treasury, this regulation may be suspect. On
the one hand, the government's interest seems slight; perhaps
the author will sell more books, but the use of the title will not
affect neutrality in prosecutorial decisions. On the other hand,
the reviewer's title is an important part of who he is. Its use
conveys his own achievements and expertise and gives the read-
er important information about the weight of the review or en-
programs and operations of his agency." Id. § 2635.807(a)(2)(E)(3) (1995).
217. See National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
218. Farina, supra note 5, at 316; see id. at 317 (asserting that "there are several
distinct ethical concerns that might be raised by employees' outside activities").
219. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013 n.12.
220. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.702, .807(b) (1995).
221. Id. § 2635.702(c) example 4.
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dorsement. Other regulations may be open to similar challeng-
es. 2 As long as there is a close relationship between the
speech and the employment, there is nonetheless a good possibil-
ity that the assumed validity of a nexus approach will permit
such restrictions. National Treasury does not, in theory, do away
with the notion that one gives up certain rights while working
for the government. The far more serious question is the extent
to which the government may restrict the speech of those who
no longer work for it.
B. National Treasury and the "Revolving Door"
So-called "revolving-door" provisions are one of the staples of
American ethics law." They limit or prohibit contact between
a former government employee and the government of which she
was a part. The revolving door is a hot political issue. According
to an official of Common Cause, "[tihe spread of revolving door
abuses has been one of the chief causes of concern in the current
ethics crisis in Washington. Few things are more discouraging
and demoralizing to honorable public servants and to the Ameri-
can people than the spectacle of public officials cashing in on
their positions of public trust."2" The problem is thought to be
widespread."
Although existing statutes deal with revolving-door abuses to
a considerable extent, politicians recently have outdone them-
selves in efforts to make these restrictions tighter. President
Clinton's first Executive Order-dated January 20,
1993-imposed "markedly more stringent post-employment re-
strictions on high-level appointees."226 In 1993, a Senate Com-
222. Farina, supra note 5, at 321-22.
223. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1994) (placing restrictions on former members of execu-
tive and legislative branches); see Nolan, supra note 8, at 84-88.
224. McBride, supra note 185, at 470.
225. The Ethics in Government Reform Act of 1993 and the Responsible Govern-
ment Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 420 and S. 79 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Sen. David L. Boren
of Oklahoma).
226. Exec. Order No. 12,834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993); Farina, supra note 5, at
290.
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mittee held hearings on proposals to impose additional restric-
tions, some applicable on a government-wide basis.227 The cur-
rent Congress is considering a range of proposals, including one
to deal with "cross-over lobbying" in which a former member of
one branch lobbies a branch with which she was not associat-
ed."8 In the following analysis, I will focus on existing law,
with some reference to proposed extensions and restrictions
applicable to former executive branch personnel.
The prototypical revolving-door statute is 18 U.S.C. § 207.229
One of its key concepts is that of the "particular matter," one in
which the United States is a party or has an interest and "Which
involved a specific party or specific parties."" Its scope is not
limited to adjudicatory proceedings but can include, for example,
contracts, claims, applications, and investigations.23' Under §
207, a former executive branch employee who "participated per-
sonally and substantially" in the matter may not "knowingly
make[], with the intent to influence, any communication to or
appearance before any officer or employee of any department,
agency, court, or court-martial of the United States ... on behalf
of any other person ... in connection with [that] particular mat-
ter."232 This is a lifetime ban.233
Another important approach of § 207 is to focus on the gener-
227. S. 420, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(5) (1993).
228. H.R. 1576, 104th Cong., 1st Sess § 2 (1995); Damon Chappie, Lobbying, House,
Senate Lawmakers Back Tough Provisions To Shut Revolving Door, Daily Rep. for
Execs. (BNA), May 4, 1995, at 86.
229. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1994) (placing restrictions on former officers, employees, and
elected officials of the executive and legislative branches).
230. Id. § 207(a)(1)(C). Massachusetts also uses the concept of a "particular matter"
in its postemployment restrictions. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 5(a) (West
1990).
231. 5 C.F.R. § 2637.102(a)(7) (1995). Massachusetts law defines "particular matter"
as;
any judicial or other proceeding, application, submission, request for a
ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusa-
tion, arrest, decision, determination, finding, but excluding enactment of
general legislation by the general court and petitions of cities, towns,
counties and districts for special laws related to their governmental orga-
nizations, powers, duties, finances and property.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 1(k).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
233. Id.
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al area of a former federal employee's work. If a matter was
within the general area of a former official's responsibility (with-
in one year prior to leaving government), then he may not lobby
with respect to it for two years." This provision combines
"particular matter" with the concept of official responsibility over
the area in which the matter arose. Another provision, applica-
ble to "[v]ery [slenior [plersonnel of the [eixecutive [b]ranch and
[ilndependent [algencies," 5 precludes such officials from lob-
bying for one year after departure with respect to any matter
anywhere within the executive branch.23 Here, the provision's
applicability depends on the former official's rank. Similarly,
President Clinton's Executive Order provides for an "Ethics
Pledge" that certain "senior appointees" will not lobby their own
agencies for five years after departure. 7
Revolving-door provisions reflect all of the basic principles on
which ethics laws are based."' A government employee's entry
into the private sector presents the danger of nonneutrality in
that the former employee's new boss gets advantages over oth-
ers, perhaps dating back to the time of employment negotiations
or even prior to them. There also may be unequal access for
those who cannot hire such high-priced talent. In addition, the
former employee may take advantage of inside knowledge. She
may be seen as retroactively using public office for private gain.
Above all, there is a general appearance problem.239
In contrast, serious policy arguments against an overly broad
use of postemployment restrictions exist. As the American Bar
Association Committee Report puts it, "[n]either sound ethics
policy nor good government supports an approach in which indi-
viduals can enter government service only at the cost of radical-
ly reconfiguring their subsequent professional lives.
"2 40
234. Id. § 207(a)(2).
235. Id. § 207(d).
236. Id.
237. Exec. Order No. 12,834, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,911 (1993). It also includes special pro-
visions concerning officials who have participated in trade negotiations.
238. Farina, supra note 5, at 327; McBride, supra note 185, at 470; Nolan, supra
note 8, at 84.
239. W.J. MICHAEL CODY & RICHARDSON R. LYNN, HONEST GOVERNMENT: AN ETH-
ICS GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE 111-12 (1992).
240. Farina, supra note 5, at 327.
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Postemployment restrictions pose what might be called the "re-
cruitment dilemma." We want citizens to serve in government
but expect many of them to return to private life." 1 One of the
rewards of government service may well be the knowledge and
stature gained while there. The private sector, as well as the
former employee, may gain from a greater understanding of
government's goals.242  There are broader questions of
individuals' rights to use their skills and society's interest in
maximizing economic activity,243 but the crucial policy question
is whether narrowing the revolving door will make government
service unattractive.2
National Treasury is a forceful reminder that these limita-
tions raise serious constitutional questions as well. Section 207
specifically prohibits "communication" in a variety of con-
texts. 5 Whether that word is used or not, lobbying represents
a form of protected speech.4 One must note that § 207 also
covers uncompensated speech, such as lobbying for an environ-
mental cause by a former EPA official. The principle of Na-
tional Treasury is that broad restrictions on public employee
speech will be subject to heightened scrutiny if they are likely to
chill a large quantity of expression in return for speculative
benefits to the government.24 This principle must apply a for-
tiori when the employee has left the government and becomes a
"first-class" citizen with the attendant rights and privileges. 9
241. See Nolan, supra note 8, at 58-62.
242. See id. at 84-88.
243. See Hearing, supra note 225, at 170-71 (statement of Robert S. Peck, Legis-
lative Counsel, ACLU).
244. See id. at 155-57 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr., Professor,
Georgetown University Law Center).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
246. Hearing, supra note 225, at 160 (statement of Robert S. Peck, Legislative
Counsel, ACLU).
247. Cf id. at 142 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr., Professor, Georgetown
University Law Center) (criticizing the lifetime ban on some officials from lobbying
or advising foreign nationals).
248. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003,
1013-14 (1995).
249. Cf. Developments-Public Employment, supra note 91, at 1773-74 (discussing
attempts by Reagan Administration to impose broad restrictions on former officials).
There may also be important private-law questions as to the length of time during
which obligations which were part of the employment relationship remain binding.
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National Treasury may have serious implications for revolv-
ing-door provisions. Indeed, lifetime bans may now be question-
able."' At some point, the utility of the former employee's
knowledge and influence will have lost much of its force. Some
employees may not have brought a great deal of such knowledge
or influence with them in the first place.251 National Treasury's
implicit emphasis on tailoring may well argue against some
lifetime bans because they fit Justice Stevens's label of "crudely
crafted."=2
Cooling-off periods, during which one may not contact former
associates or subordinates, are somewhat more difficult to as-
sess. An across-the-board one-year restriction on all executive
branch personnel was proposed in 1993.53 Its application to
lower-ranking employees poses one sort of overbreadth problem
addressed in National Treasury2 and is highly questionable.
Long cooling-off periods also raise tailoring concerns& Five-year
periods based on an official's rank have been criticized as too
sweeping.255 National Treasury certainly might be invoked as a
warning against such broad deterrence of speech based on spec-
ulative benefits. In light of that decision, the constitutional prob-
lems increase as it becomes clearer that a given proposal is
aimed primarily at an appearances problem. "Cross-over lobby-
ing" seems a particularly vulnerable area because the likelihood
that officials of one branch used their tenure there to acquire
knowledge or influence within a separate branch is even less
than in other scenarios.
In sum, National Treasury casts a shadow over
postemployment restrictions, particularly over efforts to extend
the present system. Perhaps in a judicial challenge, Congress
could come up with the sort of evidence that would satisfy the
250. See Hearing, supra note 225, at 163-69 (statement of Robert S. Peck, Legis-
lative Counsel, ACLU). One should note that Mr. Peck focuses on restrictions on
former officials who represent foreign governments.
251. See id. at 173-74.
252. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1018. Contra Farina, supra note 5, at 331.
253. S. 420, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(5) (1993).
254. See Hearing, supra note 225, at 200-01 (statement of John N. Sturdivant,
National President, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO).
255. Hearing, supra note 225, at 171 (statement of Robert S. Peck, Legislative
Counsel, ACLU); Farina, supra note 5, at 331.
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Court. A particularly interesting question would arise if the
legislative history included extensive reliance on public opinion
surveys showing that the public felt that the revolving door was
leading to corruption. In other words, the Court might face
something more than mere "speculation" about the appearance
of impropriety. Nevertheless, things may not reach this point.
National Treasury's greatest impact may come from making
Congress and other legislative bodies think twice about how far
they want ethics laws to reach. Constitutional issues slow down
the process enough to ensure that policy issues are fully ex-
plored." 6 Before reaching its nonconstitutional spillovers, how-
ever, one should consider whether National Treasury will trigger
a hard look at any other constitutional issues that ought to play
a greater role in this area.
C. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine and Its Application to Ethics
Laws-the Special Problem of "Appearance Ethics"
The most likely candidate to play a role in evaluating ethics
laws is the concept of void for vagueness, in part because of its
close association with the First Amendment's overbreadth doc-
trine.257 The "Court has long held that laws so vague that a
person of common understanding cannot know what is forbidden
are unconstitutional on their face."258 At the root of the vague-
ness doctrine are due process concepts of fair warning. 9 A
second rationale undergirding the concept of void for vagueness
is the importance of not delegating unbridled authority to those
who apply the law to citizens."' The Court frequently justifies
the vagueness doctrine as a means of safeguarding First Amend-
ment rights.1 The rationale is that unclear statutes that may
touch upon forms of expression have the effect of chilling such
expression because people will not wish to risk violating the
256. See Hearing, supra note 225, at 134 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center).
257. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 135, at 950-51.
258. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
259. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
260. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 135, at 950.
261. Id. at 951.
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law.262 The doctrine potentially is applicable in the civil, as
well as the criminal, context."c
The vagueness doctrine may be used to challenge statutes in
any number of fields, including ethics. The possibility of chal-
lenge looms larger in one branch of ethics law after National
Treasury. This branch might be called "appearance ethics"
26 4
and is one of the most controversial aspects of the entire
field.2 5 As discussed earlier,266 it is widely recognized and ac-
cepted that one of the bedrock principles of ethics regulations is
the avoidance of appearances of impropriety. Controversy erupts,
however, when the concept of appearances is transposed from an
underlying principle to an operative standard or rule. As one
critic observed, "[uin the decade and a half since Watergate, the
concept of 'appearance of impropriety' has worked its way from
relative obscurity to the forefront of our ethics debates."27 He
recognized the long-standing role of the concept as a background
understanding but viewed as recent "the promulgation and en-
forcement of a specific proscription against creating the 'appear-
ance of impropriety.'26 For this critic, a major risk is that eth-
ics laws will focus on treating "symptoms instead of causes."269
Others have pointed to the ease with which political combat-
ants can level charges of appearance violations at opponents,7 0
tarring them with the brush of ethical insensitivity. The major
262. Id. at 950-51.
263. See Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry into Vagueness, 67 VA.
L. REv. 1543, 1555 (1981).
264. Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 595 (1992).
265. For example, Professor Morgan warns against the appearance concept develop-
ing into a form of "strict liability ethics." Id. at 619.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
267. Morgan, supra note 264, at 593-94.
268. Id. at 598; see Nolan, supra note 8, at 78 (distinguishing between using ap-
pearances as the basis for rules and as a rule in themselves).
269. Morgan, supra note 264, at 615.
270. See SUZANNE GAnMENT, SCANDAL: THE CRISIS OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLI-
Tics 14 (1991) (explaining that scandals require no true immoral quality, provided
that they shock or offend the sensibilities of their audience); BENJAMIN GINSBERG &
MARTIN SHEFTER, PoLICS BY OTHER MEANS 6-7 (1990) (noting that the creation of
institutional mechanisms for investigating ethical violations, rather than a change in
public sensibilities, has led to an increase in ethical and criminal investigations).
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objection to an appearance standard is that of vagueness. 7'
The notion of the "smell test"272 sounds good in Capitol Hill de-
bate, but does it belong in positive law? On the one hand, critics
view it as "subjective and amorphous,... [providing] little guid-
ance for assessing individual conduct."2 7 On the other hand,
proponents of strong ethics laws may wish to see greater use of
specific appearance standards. Ann McBride of Common Cause
favorably notes House and Senate rules that embody this
approach. 4 She quotes with approval the observation: "[Iln
the more impersonal world of politics, reality and appearance
blend together so that we cannot often tell the difference."2 "5
For these defenders of appearance ethics, "[tihere is an ethical
obligation to protect the appearance of propriety almost as great
as to produce its reality. '276 Once again, we see the importance
of the fact that the Court handed down National Treasury at a
time of great debate over the proper reach of ethics laws. Those
who criticize appearance ethics will surely seize on the decision
as support for their position.
Currently, some doubt exists as to the utility of the vagueness
doctrine in attacking broad ethics laws.2 7 Even if a constitu-
tional challenge ultimately succeeds, the monetary and
reputational costs of defending against accusations of ethics
violations can be extensive.27 If the challenge reaches the mer-
its, it might well fail, based on a number of Supreme Court
precedents. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Waters v.
271. Nolan, supra note 8, at 78.
272. Dodd Tells Gingrich: End Book Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 1995, at 18
(quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd of Connecticut to the effect that a controversial book
deal involving House Speaker Newt Gingrich "doesn't pass the smell-test").
273. Nolan, supra note 8, at 78.
274. McBride, supra note 185, at 474-75.
275. Id. at 475 (quoting Congressional Ethics Rules, Hearings Before the House
Bipartisan Task Force on Ethics, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement of Den-
nis F. Thompson, Harvard University)).
276. Id. at 476 (quoting Congressional Ethics Rules, Hearings Before the House
Bipartisan Task Force on Ethics, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (statement of Dennis F.
Thompson, Harvard University)).
277. Thomas L. Patten, From Ethics Issues to Criminalization: Deterring the Wrong
Conduct, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 526, 532 (1990).
278. Id. at 527-30.
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Churchill7 9 stated that public employers could govern employ-
ee conduct through standards that would be "too vague when
applied to the public at large.""0 In Arnett v. Kennedy,"' a
plurality upheld a regulation authorizing removal or suspension
without pay for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service." 2 A close relationship may exist between these cases
and Parker v. Levy,' in which the Court upheld sanction of a
military doctor for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentle-
man."2 It has been suggested that such lenient applications of
the vagueness doctrine reflect the Court's perception that some
distinct institutions within society should have a freer hand in
sanctioning members than would be acceptable in the case of
citizens generally.' This theory is consistent with the restric-
tive notion of the rights of public employees that underlies many
ethics laws. Another factor that might protect appearance ethics
provisions from a vagueness challenge is public employees' abili-
ty to get advice before acting 86 or to insulate their conduct by
means of disclosure. 87 The Court has placed substantial em-
phasis on guidance and advice mechanisms when applying the
vagueness doctrine to statutes affecting public employees.2
If an appearance ethics provision were challenged on vague-
ness grounds, would National Treasury represent such a major
shift in the law that the challenge might succeed? My view is
279. 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1880 (1994).
280. Id. at 1886-87.
281. 416 U.S. 134 (1974), overruled by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 (1985). In Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, the Supreme Court upheld the "for
cause" standard but required additional pretermination procedures.
282. Id. at 160 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970)). Justice Powell concurred with
the Court on the vagueness issue. Id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring).
283. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
284. Id. at 738, 761.
285. Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders,
82 CAL. L. REV. 491, 503 (1994).
286. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268B, § 3(g) (West 1990) (authorizing State
Ethics Commission to render advisory opinions to state employees); 5 C.F.R. §
2635.107 (1995) (describing procedures for ethics advice within each federal agency).
287. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A, § 23(b)(3) (validating some conduct from
illegality on appearance grounds if proper disclosure made in advance).
288. See United States Civil Serv. Comn'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 580 (1973) (emphasizing availability of preconduct advice from Civil Ser-
vice Commission).
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that the case demonstrates such an important pro-employee
shift that the answer may well be "yes." The main impact of the
case is that, to the maximum extent possible, public employees'
grievances should be tested by the same constitutional rules as
everyone else's. The notion of a different vagueness standard is
hard to reconcile with this approach.
As for precedent, Justice Stevens dealt with Arnett in a foot-
note that suggested that the key was the facts and circumstanc-
es of the individual employee's dismissal, not the validity of the
statute applied to him." 9 An appearance ethics provision
would, of course, reflect the notion that preventing appearances
of impropriety is fundamentally important to the government.
The Court's nonreceptivity to the appearance rationale for the
honoraria ban might well carry over to the vagueness context.
At the moment, the number of provisions that have appear-
ance as the only standard is unclear. The federal practice ap-
pears to have varied.2" A vagueness challenge would be un-
likely to succeed if there were a general statement about appear-
ances backed up by a more specific set of appearance-based
rules.2 9' In particular, the use of a "reasonable person" test to
determine whether there is an appearance of impropriety would
probably insulate current statutes that are close to direct incor-
poration of an appearance standard.292
At some point, however, a provision that goes too far in the
direction of a pure appearance standard will not survive a
289. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013-14
n.12 (1995).
290. Morgan, supra note 264, at 599-602.
291. See Nolan, supra note 8, at 78 n.78. Professor Nolan quotes proposed federal
standards utilizing a reasonable person test. The final standards appear to delete a
sentence that made the applicability of a reasonableness test less certain.
292. For example, the Massachusetts statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, §
23 (West 1990), sometimes referred to as an appearance statute, specifically invokes
"a reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant circumstances." Georgia's
ethics rules for its public officials uses a similar standard, stating that:
Any person in government service should: . . . Never discriminate unfair-
ly by the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether for
remuneration or not, and never accept, for himself or his family, favors
or benefits under circumstances which might be construed by reasonable
persons as influencing the performance of his governmental duties.
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-10-1 (1990).
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vagueness challenge, especially after National Treasury. An
example would be a direction that public employees "avoid even
the appearance of impropriety."2 93 Given the zeal for ever
tighter ethics regulation, of which the revolving-door issue is a
clear example, such hypotheticals may well become reality. Na-
tional Treasury's renewed emphasis on the constitutional dimen-
sions of ethics statutes will play a key role in the inevitable
vagueness challenge.
The big question in ethics regulation today is whether to
tighten existing rules even further, primarily based on a desire
to convince the public that government really can police itself, or
to relax them substantially, based primarily on a desire not to
enmesh public employees in a sea of legalism. Constitutional
doctrines such as overbreadth and vagueness, as well as oth-
ers,29 offer partial answers. But National Treasury's impor-
tance to the debate over this question does not stop with these
answers. The decision's emphasis on the importance of tailoring
ethics statutes extends beyond the constitutional realm.
D. National Treasury's Nonconstitutional Dimensions: The
Broad Reach of Ethics Statutes and the Arguments for Greater
Tailoring
The ban on honoraria struck down in National Treasury is
typical of many ethics statutes that also sweep broadly. For
example, the federal antisalary supplementation provision states
flatly:
Whoever receives any salary, or any contribution to or sup-
293. A section of the Delaware Code provides as follows:
In order to insure propriety and preserve public trust, a public official or
employee should refrain from acting in his official capacity on any matter
wherein he has a direct or indirect personal financial interest that might
reasonably be expected to impair his objectivity or independence of judg-
ment, and should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5811(2) (1991) (emphasis added). This statute comes close
to running afoul of the arguments made here but is saved by the relatively specific
context of official action on matters in which the official is potentially interested.
The last clause also seems to be modified by a reasonableness standard of some
sort.
294. See Hearing, supra note 225, at 165 (statement of Robert S. Peck, Legislative
Counsel, ACLU) (discussing Fifth Amendments protection of liberty).
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plementation of salary, as compensation for his services as an
officer or employee of the executive branch of the United
States Government, of any independent agency of the United
States, or of the District of Columbia, from any source other
than the Government of the United States, except as may be
contributed out of the treasury of any State, county, or mu-
nicipality... [sihall be subject to the penalties set forth in
section 216 of this title.2
Many state provisions are similarly drafted. A section of the
Massachusetts Conflict of Interest Statute provides that "[a]
state employee who has a financial interest, directly or indirect-
ly, in a contract made by a state agency, in which the common-
wealth or a state agency is an interested party, of which interest
he has knowledge or has reason to know, shall be punished by
[fine or imprisonment] .. 296
Statutes drafted along these lines frequently have specific
exceptions, 297 but they may be quite narrow.2 98 The reason for
such extensive use of this approach is, of course, the prophylac-
tic nature of ethics regulations. The leading commentator on the
Massachusetts statute describes the basis for the provision quot-
ed above as follows:
[Any state employee is in a position to influence the award-
ing of contracts by any state agency in a way which is bene-
ficial to himself. In a sense, the rule is a prophylactic one.
Because it is impossible to articulate a standard by which one
can distinguish between employees in a position to influence
295. 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1994).
296. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 7 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995).
297. For example, the Massachusetts statute prohibiting financial interests in state
contracts has exemptions for special state employees and others in specified circum-
stances. Id. § 7(b)-(e).
298. Revolving-door statutes tend to be drafted with few or no exceptions to the
basic statement of coverage. Massachusetts law, for example, provides that
[a] former state employee who knowingly acts as agent or attorney for,
or receives compensation directly or indirectly from anyone other than
the commonwealth or a state agency, in connection with any particular
matter in which the commonwealth or a state agency is a party or has a
direct and substantial interest and in which he participated as a state
employee while so employed [shall be punished].
Id. § 5(a). There is a minor and limited exception for special state employees, essen-
tially unpaid or part-time employees. Id. §§ 1(o), 4.
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and those who are not, all will be treated as though they
have influence.2
The tendency toward even greater use of this approach is likely
to increase as part of what the American Bar Association Com-
mittee viewed as "the headlong rush toward even greater levels
of ethics regulations."
300
Thoughtful students of ethics regulation are nevertheless
beginning to raise questions about a possible overutilization of
the prophylactic technique. Statutes drafted along these lines
intrude on the private lives and practices of public employ-
ees.3"1 They reach so much conduct at, or even beyond, the
margin that enforcement resources may be wasted.3 2 This fact
reflects a larger problem-the potential lack of "fit" between pro-
phylactic statutes and the core conduct that needs to be prevent-
ed.303 The statutes' presumption of a propensity toward evil
can have a negative effect on employee morale0 4 and recruit-
ment.0 5 More generally, increased use of sweeping prophy-
lactic rules might be seen as a manifestation of what one critic
calls the "drug"3 6 of excessive legalism.
These observations fail to demonstrate the wisdom of aban-
doning the widespread use of prophylactic ethics statutes. As the
analysis earlier in this Article suggests,0' such statutes are an
important weapon in the legal arsenal. My experience in the
field of ethics-law administration convinces me that a context-
based0 . system requiring a case-by-case inquiry into the pres-
ence of an actual core of unethical conduct could soon bog down
into unenforceability. Nevertheless, the critics of sweeping ethics
laws have a point, and National Treasury reinforces it. National
Treasury required tailoring in the constitutional context, but the
299. Buss, supra note 10, at 374 (emphasis added).
300. Farina, supra note 5, at 290-91.
301. See Nolan, supra note 8, at 82.
302. Farina, supra note 5, at 297.
303. See id. at 328-29.
304. See id. at 294.
305. See Nolan, supra note 8, at 85-86.
306. Vaughn, supra note 166, at 433-34.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 184-90.
308. Cf Farina, supra note 5, at 319-20 (arguing for "context-sensitive" approach to
issues of outside income).
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concept need not be thus limited. Constitutional decisions can
have relevance beyond the strict contours of that document. All
agencies of government can, and should, be on the alert for op-
portunities to keep overly broad ethics statutes within sound
policy bounds.
For example, the courts have a number of construction tech-
niques available to limit the reach of statutes,0 9 although these
techniques sometimes produce questionable results. A good eth-
ics case illustrating both points is Crandon v. United States.10
In Crandon, the United States sought recovery of payments
made by the Boeing Company to a group of employees just prior
to their joining the government in defense-related positions. 1'
The government based its claim on the antisupplementation
statute quoted above. 12 Payments like these ring a number of
ethics alarm bells. They may serve to purchase goodwill if the
employee is in a position to help the payor, and they certainly
create an appearance problem among fellow employees and the
public. 13 The Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision in
favor of the government that had been based, in part, on such
classic ethics-law principles. 31 1
A principal issue in Crandon was whether to construe the
statute broadly or narrowly. The payments might be viewed as
"compensation" for government service,315 but they were not
received during government employment. The companion para-
graph of the statute covering the payor states that such persons
are liable only if they paid an "officer or employee."" 6 The
Court took the position that the statute had to be read to apply
309. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (preserving federal-
state balance as canon of statutory construction).
310. 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
311. Id. at 154-56.
312. Id. at 156 (basing its claim on 18 U.S.C. § 209 and the common law).
313. Id. at 166; see Nolan, supra note 8, at 97-99.
314. See United States v. Boeing Co., 845 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub
non. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990).
315. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 156. Justice Scalia took the view that, even though the
payments might be viewed as compensation, they could not be fitted under the cate-
gory of "salary." Id. at 171-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
316. 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) (1994).
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evenhandedly to payor and payee.31 The Court placed particu-
lar emphasis on the fact that the statute is criminal, concluding
that "it [was] appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving
any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage.""i' It de-
scribed the rule as a "time-honored interpretative guideline" that
serves to further the important goals of fair warning and mak-
ing sure that law comes from the legislature."1 9 It viewed the
legislative history as inconclusiveY.2 0 The opinion included an
extensive discussion of the policies behind broad prophylactic
ethics statutes."' Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, found
little possibility that these policies were implicated by the pre-
employment payments. 2  Any danger of favoritism toward the
former employer could be obviated by disqualification in appro-
priate cases."s He also cited "[an important countervailing
consideration"s ' of public policy: ethics statutes should not im-
pair the government's ability to recruit personnel from the pri-
vate sector.3"
Justice Stevens's opinion, particularly his reservations about
prophylactic statutes, can be viewed as a nonconstitutional ana-
logue to his National Treasury effort. In my view, the opinion is
equally open to criticism. As noted, the severance payments to
future government employees from a private entity with exten-
sive government interests represent a classic ethics threat of
the sort at which prophylactic statutes have long been aimed.
The symmetry problem was not insurmountable. Perhaps
Congress's intent could be furthered by recovering from the
payee even if the payor was not subject to criminal prosecution.
Moreover, although Crandon was not a criminal case, the Court
should have at least paused to consider whether the rule of
lenity was automatically applicable. Many ethics statutes have
317. See Crandon, 494 U.S. at 159.
318. Id. at 158.
319. Id. (citations omitted).
320. Id. at 160-63.
321. Id. at 164-67.
322. Id. at 167-68.
323. Id. at 166.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 166-67.
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both civil and criminal application."' Whether the same prin-
ciples of construction are equally applicable is worthy of some
consideration."7
A particularly troubling aspect of Crandon is its relative lack
of recognition of a quite different conception of the role of courts
in construing federal ethics statutes. The cornerstone decision is
United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,328 which
Justice Stevens relegated to a footnote."9 Mississippi Valley
also involved civil application of a criminal ethics provision.3
This statute forbade persons with direct or indirect interests in
a private entity from representing the United States in transact-
ing business with that entity.331 The alleged violators, con-
tending that their interests were too indirect, argued for a nar-
row construction of the statute. They invoked the rule of lenity,
in its alternate form, as "the time-honored canon that penal
statutes are to be narrowly construed."332 The Court rejected
the violators' position in tones that sound quite different from
326. In 1989, Congress added § 216 to Title 18 of the United States Code. Pub. L.
No. 101-194, § 407(a), 103 Stat. 1753 (1989). This section specifically provides a
range of civil remedies for violations of the criminal ethics-related sections of Title
18. Id.
327. Obviously, principles of fair warning argue strongly for uniform construction. A
civil context might arise, however, in which the government sought to develop a
common-law theory of employee liability using the statute as one source among
others. The statute thus could be part of a broader recovery under this theory than
if the government sued directly under it.
328. 364 U.S. 520 (1961).
329. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 165 n.20.
330. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 323-24 (involving a private party whose con-
tract with the government was possibly tainted with a conflict of interest and who
sued to recover under the contract). A suit such as that in Mississippi Valley is a
possible example of a context in which a federal common-law approach, see supra
note 327, might be developed.
331. The statute in question read as follows:
Whoever, being an officer, agent or member of, or directly or indirectly
interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corporation, joint-
stock company, or association, or of any firm or partnership, or other
business entity, is employed or acts as an officer or agent of the United
States for the transaction of business with such business entity, shall be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 434 (1958). This section was repealed by Pub. L. No. 87-849, §2, 76
Stat. 1126 (1962).
332. Mississippi Valley, 364 U.S. at 550.
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those of Crandon. It noted the prophylactic nature of the
rule,3 ' stating that "the statute establishes an objective stan-
dard of conduct, and... whenever a government agent fails to
act in accordance with that standard, he is guilty of violating the
statute, regardless of whether there is positive corruption."34
The dissonance between the two cases shows that courts can
take quite different approaches to broad, prophylactic ethics
laws when nonconstitutional issues are raised. Mississippi Val-
ley represents the traditional view of deference both to the legis-
lature and its techniques. Crandon indicates a desire to narrow,
a refusal to read statutes for all they are worth. Perhaps
Crandon represents a pre-National Treasury endorsement of the
tailoring approach and of the critiques of broad-based drafting
cited above.3 5 Even if one accepts the validity of these revi-
sionist themes-and I certainly think they are worth explor-
ing-it does not follow that the courts should do the tailoring.
Maybe the ethics laws need changing, but that change need not
come from the courts. Government officials, of all people, ought
to know the law as it stands now and be willing to obey it. 36
The biggest problem is that strained construction can produce
tailoring of a sort in specific cases, but it presents its own prob-
lem of "fit." The cdurts simply are not in the position to make
fundamental changes of the sort that the critics of prophylactic
rules view as most needed. While the most important
nonconstitutional message of National Treasuy is, indeed, that
the concept of tailoring is of potentially great utility in the field
333. Id.; see also id at 550 n.14, 559 (describing conflict-of-interest statutes as
"preventive").
334. Id. at 549; see also id. at 551 (finding "that Congress intended to establish a
rigid rule of conduct"); id. at 559 (noting that the rule "lays down an absolute stan-
dard of conduct"); id. at 560-61 (stating that "the statute establishes an objective,
not a subjective, standard, and it is therefore of little moment whether the agent
thought he was violating the statute, if the objective facts show that there was a
conflict of interest").
335. See supra text accompanying notes 302-06.
336. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 375 n.9 (1987) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("When considering how much weight to accord to the doctrine of lenity, it
is appropriate to identify the class of litigants that will benefit from the Court's rul-
ing today. They are not uneducated, or even average, citizens."). Earlier in his
opinion, Justice Stevens argued against a narrow construction of the criminal statute
in question. Id at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of ethics laws, those who can benefit from this message are
entities other than the courts.
To the extent that the use of broad prophylactic statutes
needs to be reexamined, the obvious place for that reexamina-
tion to occur is in the legislatures that draft them. Broad prohi-
bitions on gifts to public officials13 7 are a possible example. The
rationale is to reach instances of influence peddling or attempts
to purchase influence, without requiring an explicit connection
to a specific official act.338 This could mean, however, that an
innocent gift, such as a trophy to a successful football coach,
would be illegal as well. As in other instances, a prophylactic
statute may sweep too broadly.339 Recently, a Special Legisla-
tive Study Commission recommended amending the Massachu-
setts law specifically to exempt those gifts that do not present
the dangers at which it was aimed.340 At the federal level, the
American Bar Association Committee recommended to Congress
specific changes in the ethics statutes that would produce a
337. Massachusetts law provides that:
[Wihoever otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of
official duty, directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of
substantial value to any present or former state, county or municipal
employee or to any member of the judiciary, or to any person selected to
be such an employee or member of the judiciary, for or because of any
official act performed or to be performed by such an employee or member
of the judiciary or person selected to be such an employee or member of
the judiciary . .. shall be punished by a fine of not more than three
thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or
both.
MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 268A, § 3(a), (d) (West 1990).
338. The Massachusetts State Ethics Commission has stated that:
[Even] in the absence of any specifically identifiable matter that was, is
or soon will be pending before the official, section 3 may apply. Thus,
where there is no prior social or business relationship between the giver
and the recipient, and the recipient is a public official who is in a posi-
tion to use his authority in a manner which could affect the giver, an
inference can be drawn that the giver was seeking the goodwill of the
official because of a perception by the giver that the public official's influ-
ence could benefit the giver. In such a case, the gratuity is given for as
yet unidentified "acts to be performed."
Mass. State Ethics Comm'n, Advisory No. 8, May 14, 1985.
339. A broad interpretation of the Massachusetts statute has been challenged.
See United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 279, 286-88 (D. Mass. 1995) (rejecting
challenge).
340. See Mass. Special Commission Report, supra note 24, at 18-19.
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more context-sensitive approach.34'
The legislature, however, cannot think of every situation. The
administrative process has an important role to play in calibrat-
ing broad-based prohibitions.42 In some cases, administrative
agencies have attempted to find flexibility in a statute when
their authority to do so was far from clear.43 The preferable
approach would be explicit statutory authority for appropriate
tailoring.3  Again, the Massachusetts Special Legislative
Commission's recommendations on gifts provide an example. In
addition to a specific set of exemptions within the statute, the
study commission recommended that the State Ethics Commis-
sion be authorized to extend the coverage of the exemptions both
through regulations and case-by-case waivers." In each such
instance, the Commission would be required to "balance the
public interest in preventing improper attempts to influence the
decisions of public employees with the legitimate interests of
public employees and their families in receiving items of value
that pose no genuine risk of affecting the performance of their
official duties."346
This kind of double tailoring-at both the legislative and ad-
ministrative levels-responds to concerns of "fit" while keeping
the broad prophylactic approach intact. It accepts as legitimate
the point of view of the critics without taking the radical step of
abandoning the basic approach of many of the nation's ethics
statutes. To the extent that National Treasury encourages think-
ing along these lines, it is a helpful decision. Policymakers need
to realize that what makes constitutional sense can have useful
implications elsewhere. As I have noted, I am concerned with
potential problems of extensive judicial efforts to narrow the
reach of ethics laws. Nevertheless, I have even graver concerns
341. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 5, at 297-304 (recommending changes in 18
U.S.C. § 208).
342. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 182-83 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
343. See id. at 182 (describing "liberties that the Government has taken with its
interpretation of § 209(a)").
344. See id. at 183 (recommending direct use of President's authority to promulgate
standards for the Executive Branch under 5 U.S.C. § 7301).
345. Mass. Special Commission Report, supra note 24, at 19-20.
346. Id.
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about determining just how far the courts will take National
Treasury's constitutional implications. These ramifications do
not stop at the border of government ethics laws. The decision
may have important and unfortunate impacts on the related
fields of public employee political activity and campaign fi-
nance reform. The next two sections analyze briefly the possi-
ble impacts.
IV. WAS THE HATCH ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Prior to its amendment in 1993," the Hatch Act' signifi-
cantly curtailed the First Amendment rights of federal employ-
ees. 4' The key section provided that a federal employee shall
not "take an active part in political management or in political
campaigns.""'0 This broad prohibition was amplified by rules of
the Civil Service Commission, which the Act specifically incorpo-
rated.35' Prohibited activities included serving as an officer of a
political party, a local party committee, or a partisan political
club; soliciting funds for partisan political purposes; taking an
active part in managing a partisan political campaign; running
as a party candidate for elective office; soliciting votes for a
partisan candidate; serving as a delegate to a party convention;
and initiating or circulating nominating petitions. 52
A close relationship exists between the Hatch Act and the
various ethics laws referred to throughout this Article. A princi-
pal goal of both types of statutes is to ensure neutrality on the
part of public servants. Public employees could easily transfer
their staunch commitment to partisan politics to differential
treatment of citizens depending on their political persuasion. As
347. Frank J. Murray, Clinton Abolishes Many Hatch Act Political Constraints,
WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1993, at A9.
348. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1988).
349. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 111 (1947) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that Hatch Act "muzzles several million citizens"); Murray, supra note
347, at A9 (quoting President Clinton's statement that "[tihe conditions which once
gave rise to the Hatch Act . . . are no longer present, and they cannot justify the
continued muzzling of millions of American citizens").
350. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2).
351. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 576-78 n.21 (1973).
352. Id.
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the Supreme Court said in upholding the Hatch Act:
A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great
end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-it
is essential that federal employees ... not take formal posi-
tions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial
roles in partisan political campaigns, and not run for office on
partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will
reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.35
The Act also has an important appearance dimension.354 It rec-
ognizes the importance of the public's perception that services
are administered on a nonpartisan basis.
There is, however, another dimension to the Hatch Act's pur-
poses that aims at protecting employee rights and on-the-job
morale.355 In a highly partisan workplace, those employees who
do not go along with the majority may justifiably fear for their
advancement or careers.356 In distinguishing the Hatch Act
from the honoraria ban at issue in National Treasury, Justice
Stevens emphasized the employee rights dimension of the for-
mer.35 As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in dissent, how-
ever, the ethics goals of the Hatch Act are at least as important
as any employee protection dimension.35 Moreover, ethics laws
also have an employee morale dimension. For example, unduly
close relationships between favored public employees and power-
ful outside interests can breed bitterness and resentment among
other employees. 59
353. Id. at 565.
354. Id.
355. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015
(1995).
356. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564 (agreeing with view that limiting partisan
political activity by federal employees ensures that "employees themselves are ...
sufficiently free from improper influences"). The Court had earlier quoted United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 98 (1947), on the dangers to the public
service of "an actively partisan governmental personnel," Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at
555.
357. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
358. Id. at 1026 (Rehnquist, C.J.' dissenting).
359. SPECIAL COMM'N ON THE FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW, Ass'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 211
(1960).
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One can easily see the Hatch Act as a first cousin of the ethics
laws. They even share a common ancestor-the civil service
reform movement of the nineteenth century."6 The same
doubts that National Treasury casts upon ethics statutes in
general are particularly strong with respect to the Hatch Act, at
least in its prior form. It prohibited speech, indeed, speech of a
distinctly higher First Amendment value than that at issue in
National Treasury."6 1 The Hatch Act made no distinction be-
tween high-level and lower-ranking employees."2 It also ap-
plied to a large number of employees. In addition, much of its
impact was felt outside the workplace, cutting deeply into the
private lives of public servants. Perhaps most significantly, it
reinforced the notion that public employees have fewer rights
than citizens generally."63
To spend time on the Hatch Act in its prior incarnation may
seem fanciful. Nevertheless, the potential combination of a Re-
publican President and Congress might well lead to its restora-
tion. To suggest that National Treasury casts any doubt upon
the Hatch Act in its prior form or in some future variant may
seem equally fanciful. The Supreme Court has twice upheld
it,3 and those cases were cited with apparent approval in
National Treasury.65 Nevertheless, the Court's analyses in Na-
tional Treasury and its predecessors are not completely in ac-
cord. As Justice Douglas once noted, United Public Workers v.
Mitchell,66 the first of these cases, is the product of an earlier
time.367 The Court in that case brushed aside a First Amend-
ment challenge to the Hatch Act, largely on the ground of judi-
360. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 557-58; Vaughn, supra note 166, at 419-21.
361. Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
362. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 113-14 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
363. See id. at 111 (Black, J., dissenting) ("There is nothing about federal and state
employees as a class which justifies depriving them or society of the benefits of their
participation in public affairs.").
364. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548; Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75.
365. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015
(1995).
366. 330 U.S. 75.
367. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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cial deference to legislative control over the public service.365
To give one quote among many, the majority opinion stated that
"[w]hen actions of civil servants in the judgment of Congress
menace the integrity and the competency of the service, legis-
lation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its use-
fulness is required."369 Mitchell contained little First Amend-
ment analysis. The Court had not yet decided Pickering v. Board
of Education, 7 and an important premise of Mitchell was the
second-class status of public employees when it comes to assert-
ing constitutional rights.37'
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers,72 the second case upholding the Hatch Act,
was a post-Pickering decision. Once again, the theme of defer-
ence to Congress and the Executive dominated.3  As for
Pickering, the Court in Letter Carriers bowed to the need to bal-
ance but found determinative the fact that the legislation served
"important interests."74 The balance therefore came out in the
employer's favor, due, it must be inferred, to the fact that Con-
gress thought it important to ban partisan political activity.
The great pains that Justice Stevens took in National Trea-
sury to distinguish these cases strongly indicate that there is a
fundamental disharmony between them and his analysis there.
As noted, he treated the Hatch Act as a statute protecting em-
ployee rights, 75 as opposed to the honoraria ban. He even sug-
gested that this protective dimension had justified the earlier
cases' deference to Congress. 76 If anything, however, the
Court's willingness to leave public employees at the mercy of
Congress led it, in Mitchell, to sanction curbing the employees'
368. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 101-02.
369. Id. at 103.
370. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
371. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 96-97. The Court said of Ex Parte Curtis that "[t]he
decisive principle was the power of Congress, within reasonable limits, to regulate,
so far as it might deem necessary, the political conduct of its employees." Id. at 96.
372. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
373. Id. at 564-65.
374. Id. at 564.
375. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015
(1995).
376. Id. at 1017-18 n.21.
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rights.377 Perhaps most indicative of Justice Stevens's unease
with the prior cases was his insistence that, even in Letter Car-
riers, "we did not determine how the components of the
Pickering balance should be analyzed in the context of a sweep-
ing statutory impediment to speech."3 78 The Hatch Act certain-
ly swept broadly. The balancing was there as well, even if done
in a perfunctory manner. The obviously tenuous nature of these
distinctions bears out one of this Article's main points: National
Treasury casts serious doubt on broad-based reform statutes
that limit the First Amendment rights of public employees.
One distinction, perhaps, permits the pro-government Hatch
Act cases to coexist with the pro-employee result in National
Treasury. In the latter case, Justice Stevens stated that "Con-
gress effectively designed the Hatch Act to combat demonstrated
ill effects of Government employees' partisan political activi-
ties."379 In contrast, he viewed the honoraria ban as resting on
speculation without evidence.8 ' As his opinion noted, however,
the prior cases rest, in part, on what Congress "deemed" to con-
stitute the risks of employee partisanship."8 ' The many abuses
of the spoils system admittedly had been well-known and often
criticized, especially by reformers. 8 ' In upholding the Hatch
Act, the Court could therefore invoke the "judgment of histo-
ry,,383 but that judgment consisted in large part of the views of
Congress and the executive branch, including the Civil Service
Commission.' One might also invoke "the judgment of histo-
ry" to validate sweeping ethics laws that reach a wide range of
employee conduct. The prohibition on salary supplementation,
377. See id. at 1025-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 1013.
379. Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).
380. Id. at 1016.
381. Id.; see also United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947) (as-
serting that partisan political activity had only to be "reasonably deemed by Con-
gress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service" in order to be legitimately
barred).
382. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 566 n.12 (1973) (citing congressional hearings on reform legislation).
383. Id. at 557.
384. See id. at 558-63.
1036 [Vol. 37:979
GOVERNMENT ETHICS
for example, dates back to 1917.31 Like the Hatch Act, well-
documented practices, which Congress viewed as abuses, trig-
gered the prohibition.3" The question arises why Congress can-
not alter the ethics laws over time, striking different balances as
its judgment dictates. It can, in theory, but National Treasury
shows a new willingness to second-guess those judgments, at
least when the First Amendment is at stake.
V. THE REAFFIRMATION OF BUCKLEY V. VALEO AND ITS
CONTINUING SHADOW OVER CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
The potential anti-reformist implications of National Treasury
are not limited to the field of government ethics. The case will
likely have significant impact on the closely related subject of
campaign finance reform. Whether the Court intended to do so
or not, National Treasury stands as a striking reaffirmation of
the principles of Buckley v. Valeo,87 the 1976 decision that
struck down important provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971" as violative of the First Amendment. The
Court in Buckley ruled that Congress could not limit indepen-
dent expenditures in aid of candidates, 89 limit the amounts
that individuals might spend on their own campaigns," or im-
pose campaign expenditure limitations generally. 91 As the
Court saw the problem, "[a] restriction on the amount of money
a person or group can spend on political communication during a
campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by re-
stricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their ex-
ploration, and the size of the audience reached." 92
At the same time, the Court ruled that Congress could limit
campaign contributions, as opposed to expenditures. 9 3 Contri-
butions were viewed as a step toward political debate, involving
385. Nolan, supra note 8, at 68.
386. Id.
387. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
388. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
389. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7, 51.
390. Id. at 57-59.
391. Id. at 58.
392. Id. at 19.
393. Id. at 28-29.
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"speech by someone other than the contributor."31 Moreover,
to the extent that the contribution is itself speech, the con-
tributor is still free to make it, subject to the limits.3 19 The
Court viewed this limit as not reducing the contributor's ability
to express his support through the act of contributing.3 6 The
Court also was swayed by ethics-like arguments based on the
dangers of corruption or the appearance of corruption when
large contributions are allowed.397
Critics, both on and off the Court, have had great sport poking
holes in the contributions-expenditure distinction. 8 In the
modern, money-driven political campaign, contributions and
expenditures are inexorably related. The former is the latter one
step removed. Whatever protection the First Amendment pro-
vides to this type of speech ought to extend to both. Another
weakness of Buckley is the Court's ambivalence over whether to
defer to Congress in matters of campaign finance reform. The
opinion states that Congress could "legitimately conclude,"399
and "was surely entitled to conclude, " "4 O that contributions
present the reality or appearance of corruption. When it came to
expenditures, however, the Court seemed to substitute its own
judgment. The opinion stated, for example, that independent
expenditures do not "appear to pose dangers of real or apparent
corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions"4 ' and that they "may well provide little assis-
tance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove
counterproductive."4 2
In the words of one critic, Buckley has "cast[] a long shad-
ow"403 over the field of campaign finance reform legislation.
394. Id. at 21.
395. Id. at 20-21.
396. Id. at 21.
397. Id. at 26-27.
398. Id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 259-
66 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 290 (Blacknun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Levit, supra note 1, at 473.
399. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
400. Id. at 28.
401. Id. at 46.
402. Id. at 47.
403. Levit, supra note 1, at 475.
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Any such reformist initiatives aim at reducing or eliminating the
influence of private money on elections. Buckley's refusal to
allow spending limits makes an already difficult task even more
so. If Buckley were ever extended to invalidate contribution
limits as well, campaign finance reform might become impossi-
ble. Some have concluded that the decision must be over-
ruled.0 4 In recent years, Congress has attempted to bypass
Buckley by devising "voluntary" spending limits schemes to
which candidates would agree in return for some form of public
financing.0 5 Congressional opponents of campaign finance re-
form repeatedly have invoked Buckley as an insurmountable ob-
stacle to all such efforts.
40 6
In 1990, the Court appeared to have second thoughts about
Buckley. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,0 7 the
Court upheld a state law prohibiting corporations from using
general treasury funds to support or oppose candidates in state
elections. The majority purported to adhere to Buckley's distinc-
tions between contributions and expenditures408 but found it
inapplicable when corporations are involved. The Court saw the
problem not as one of any potential quid pro quo, but as a mat-
ter of "a different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas."40 9
The dissenting Justices saw Austin as erasing the line be-
tween contributions and expenditures, leaving Buckley's status
highly uncertain. 40 Austin's acceptance of the disparate treat-
ment of corporate expenditures also suggested acceptance of an
argument rejected out of hand in Buckley-that First
Amendment analysis could tolerate the notion that "government
404. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 22, at 1211.
405. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 1, at 487-503.
406. See id. at 477 (quoting Senator Mitch McConnell's statement that "I'll be the
Jim Buckley of 1993.").
407. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
408. Id. at 659.
409. Id. at 660.
410. Id. at 683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 703-05 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others."41' A reformist might
derive from Austin the specific notion that campaign spending
limits have validity after all and that some range of wealth
equalization is permissible in campaign finance reform and
related areas.412 I contend, however, that National Treasury
puts Buckley back on its pedestal and relegates Austin to the
background.41'
The basic premise of this contention is that ethics laws and
campaign finance laws seek to further similar goals. These laws
aim at increasing public confidence in government through pre-
venting corruption and the appearance of corruption. The neu-
trality principle is also present. Just as all public employees
should treat citizens equally, elected officials should not allow
greater access to some based on a financial relationship. Neither
set of officials should be able to be bought. Admittedly, there are
important distinctions between elected and nonelected officials
that weaken the link between ethics laws and campaign finance
laws.414 Elected officials are subject to the additional checks of
the electoral process itself. Disclosure laws affect them with
particular force.415 Campaign donations to political candidates
from "special interests"-as long as they are not obviously linked
to present or future votes-are valid regardless of the obvious
resemblance to gifts from prohibited sources.416
Despite these differences, the same anticorruption and related
rationales that underlie ethics laws rest at the heart of efforts to
reform campaign finance laws.417 As the former President of
411. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
412. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance
and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381 (1992) (concluding
that, although campaign finance reform efforts merit judicial leeway, courts have not
applied consistent, constructive review to the efforts).
413. Austin might then be viewed primarily as a case dealing with state regulation
of corporations. Cf Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59 (noting the role of state law in creat-
ing corporations).
414. See Vaughn, supra note 166, at 425-26.
415. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
416. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 272-74 (1991) (noting the
frequency with which legislators who have received contributions act to help the
contributor).
417. See Fred Wertheimer & Susan W. Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
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Common Cause put it:
The pervasive dependence of elected officials on special-in-
terest money is central to the crisis in public confidence
that faces our government today. The public's belief that its
interests are not being served in Washington is a direct
reflection of the way in which monied interests and the
pursuit of political-influence money by elected officials have
become dominant forces in our political life. The extraordi-
nary public cynicism we see today profoundly threatens our
democracy.411
The Supreme Court in Buckley framed the various issues as
the extent to which congressional anticorruption goals can over-
ride First Amendment freedoms. 419 Nevertheless, this is pre-
cisely what the Court would not allow in National Treasury.
Congress could not try something new in its long-standing prac-
tice of regulating public employee speech when the result would
be a "wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression."420
This same quantitative approach was important in Buckley42
and will be important in any future balancing of interests. If the
government cannot curtail the speech at issue in National Trea-
sury, its ability to limit financial speech at the heart of political
campaigns is a fortiori forbidden. The lack of deference shown by
the Court to Congress's anticorruption judgments in both cases
is another important unifying element. It is hard to escape the
conclusion that National Treasury will have an important im-
pact on campaign finance. If, as contended here, Buckley emerg-
es strengthened from the seemingly unrelated honoraria contro-
versy, it will continue to cast its long shadow on campaign fi-
nance reform.
One might go further and argue that Buckley, with its sharp
rejection of an equalization rationale, also casts a shadow on
ethics laws that aim to neutralize the ability of special interests
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLu . L. REV. 1126 (1994).
418. Id. at 1127.
419. E.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-49.
420. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013
(1995).
421. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
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to influence nonelected public employees by financial means. A
former employee subject to a revolving-door limitation cannot
"speak" on behalf of a wealthy client who seeks to gain an ad-
vantage over those less wealthy. Might the Court say here as
well that "the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment?"422
VI. CONCLUSION
The Constitution always has the potential to get in the way of
well-intentioned government acts-from catching terrorists to
curbing pornography. It is tempting to regard National Treasury
as only another example of this phenomenon. The government
went too far in its effort to keep employees from receiving ques-
tionable outside income in the form of honoraria. The Court,
enforcing the First Amendment, stepped in and stopped this
abridgment of expression. So far, so good. Nevertheless, few
Supreme Court decisions stand alone without "ripple effects"
beyond their immediate facts.
Viewed in this way, National Treasury is cause for concern. A
majority of the Court downplayed Congress's role in attempting
to bring about a more ethical government. The case admittedly
seems to have turned on a possibly excessive concern about the
appearance of impropriety. The way government appears to its
citizens, however, is important in framing their views about how
it works and whether it is "clean." This is a fundamental issue.
It would be unfortunate if National Treasury came to be seen as
a roadblock to congressional and state legislative efforts in the
area of government ethics.
The closely related areas of campaign finance reform and
public employee political activity also present potential ripple ef-
fects. Here, too, the ability to respond to public cynicism and
mistrust is important. The Court needs to show a greater defer-
ence to legislative efforts on such matters than it did in National
Treasury. Public employees have rights, including the right to
seek judicial relief from oppressive legislation. In such cases,
422. Id. at 48-49.
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however, the judiciary needs to remember that its aid is invoked
by one of the most powerful groups in our society. When the
government seeks to reform itself, any number of reasons exist
for deferring to the judgment of the political process. The ab-
sence of this deference may be National Treasury's most disturb-
ing legacy.
